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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A considerable number of studies document that cross-listing in the United States 
(U.S.) generates several potential benefits. For instance, by cross-listing in a U.S. stock 
exchange, foreign companies have to comply with more stringent disclosure standards 
and better legal protection of minority investors (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). 
Among other things, these rules can reduce opportunities for insider trading (Coffee, 
2007), improve firms’ access to external finance (e.g., Reese and Weisbach (2002)), 
relax financial constraints (e.g., Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005)), and reduce the 
cost of capital (e.g., Errunza and Miller (2000), Reese and Weisbach (2002), Hail and 
Leuz (2009)). The required compliance with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rules represents an obvious cost for firms that cross-list in the U.S. This cost has 
increased after the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act1 (SOX) in 2002, making it more 
difficult for some foreign firms to maintain a U.S. listing. Therefore, on March 21, 
2007, the SEC adopted the Rule 12h-62, which made it easier for a foreign firm to leave 
a U.S. exchange market. After the passage of Rule 12h-6, more foreign firms delisted 
from a U.S. stock exchange than in the post-SOX period in 2002. This regime shift 
motivated some recent studies to explore the determinants and the economic effects of 
cross-delisting (e.g., Marosi and Massoud (2008), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2010), 
Fernandes, Lel and Miller (2010), Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012)). However, the 
literature has not yet addressed the effects of delisting on firms’ real investment 
decisions.  
In this study, our purpose is to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the real 
economic consequences of cross-delisting from a U.S. exchange and by investigating 
the post-cross-delisting financial constraints and investment sensitivities. Our study 
contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we document an adverse effect on the 
financial constraints of firms that cross-delist. For instance, after cross-delisting, firms 
exhibit a higher degree of financial constraints compared to the control group of firms 
 
1
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is a U.S. federal law that predicts enhanced standards for all U.S. public companies. 
2
 Under Rule 12h-6 of March, 21, 2007, foreign companies that have and maintain a foreign listing which is its primary trading 
market (for at least 12 months preceding deregistration), can qualify for deregistration if the average daily trading volume of the 
subject class in the U.S. for a recent 12-month period is no more than five percent of the average daily trading volume of that class 
of securities on a worldwide basis for the same period. Previous Rule 12g-4 applies (with an easier method of counting U.S.-resident 
holders), but the new eligibility conditions also apply. See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-
overview.shtml. 
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that remained cross-listed. We show empirically that the investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity of cross-delisted firms is significantly higher than that of the control group of 
cross-listed firms. Furthermore, we examine the sensitivity of cash-to-cash flow and 
find evidence that cross-delisted firms, on average, save more cash out of cash flows 
than cross-listed firms. Second, we investigate a possible reason to explain the increase 
in the financial constraints post-cross-delisting – the deterioration of the information 
environment with the consequent rise in information asymmetry. We do so by testing 
how the investment sensitivity to stock prices is affected by negative informational 
shocks before and after the cross-delisting. We borrow the arguments of the “learning” 
hypothesis (e.g., Bond, Edmans and Goldstein (2012), Foucault and Frésard (2012)) and 
postulate that when stock prices are more informative, managers are able to make better 
investment decisions and, therefore, we should observe a positive sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices. When firms are hit by a negative informational shock, stock 
prices become less informative, which translate into a lower investment-to-price 
sensitivity. To perform this test, we use two measures that should capture the change in 
the informational content of stock prices: changes in bid-ask spread, and changes in the 
research and development (R&D) expenses. We find that a negative shock to the 
informational content of stock prices has a stronger impact on the investment-to-price 
sensitivity in the post-cross-delisting period. In other words, adverse changes in the 
information environment make stock prices less informative to managers, especially in 
the post-cross-delisting period.  
We test our hypotheses using a treatment group of firms that delist at some point 
during our sample period – 2000 to 2012 – and two separate control groups of firms: i) a 
primary control group of foreign firms that remained listed in a U.S. exchange across 
our sample period; ii) an alternate control group of never-cross-listed firms, i.e., firms 
that have never been listed in any market other than the domestic market. Using the 
control group of never-cross-listed firms should allow us to better control for 
confounding effects around cross-delisting. Those confounding effects may arise from 
economic and financial events that are unrelated to cross-delisting, such as potential 
consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Thereby, our final sample consists of 
583 treatment firms from 38 countries, 564 control firms that remained cross-listed 
throughout the sample period, and 10,397 control firms that have never been cross-
listed over the sample period.  
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To test our main hypotheses, we first employ the Lemmon and Zender’s (2010) 
modification test of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) to show that financial constraints 
are different from debt capacity. Next, we employ a difference-in-differences 
methodology and use propensity score matching (PSM) to reduce the selection bias that 
might affect the baseline results. Our main results show that firms become more 
financially constrained after cross-delisting and that investment-to-price sensitivity 
reacts more negatively in the post-cross-delisting period to adverse informational 
shocks; our findings are robust to the use of alternative measures of investment, 
different estimation techniques, and alternate measures of financial constraints and 
information asymmetry proxies. Consistent with the “bonding” hypothesis, we also 
show that firms from countries with poor information disclosure requirements and 
weaker investor protection regimes are more penalized in their financial constraints 
after cross-delisting.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the real economic 
effects of cross-delisting on financial constraints and investment sensitivities. The 
remaining of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
related literature and outlines our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and 
the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes our 
main conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
The “bonding” hypothesis of Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999, 2002) posits that 
foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S. commit themselves to higher levels of financial 
disclosure and transparency to meet the more stringent SEC requirements and, 
therefore, improve their standards of corporate governance, which helps reduce their 
cost of capital. The benefits from cross-listing in the U.S. (in particular on a stock 
exchange) are expected to be greater for firms that face more financial constraints in 
their home markets. Financial constraints occur when capital markets frictions impose a 
wedge between the costs of internal and external financing sources. Previous studies of 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), and 
Djankov et al. (2008) argue that firms are less financially constrained in economies with 
more developed capital markets, suggesting that those firms have more ability to take 
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advantage of their growth opportunities. However, as noted by Karolyi (2012), very few 
studies examine the corporate investment activity of U.S. cross-listed firms. Lins, 
Strickland and Zenner (2005) are one of the first (and one of the few) to provide 
evidence that firms from emerging markets improve access to external financing 
following a U.S. listing, thereby relaxing financing constraints. The authors document 
that those firms make almost no mention to capital constraints three years after their 
U.S. listing3. Their argument is that improvements (relative to a firm’s home market) in 
shareholder protection and liquidity help reduce the effects of information asymmetry, 
which in turn relaxes financial constraints. To test their predictions, they use a sample 
of foreign listings on U.S. exchange markets, over the period 1986-1996, and employed 
the Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) methodology by testing the investment 
sensitivity to cash flow. The intuition behind this methodology is that the sensitivity of 
investment to the firm’s cash flow is positively related to the degree of financial 
constraints. When that sensitivity is higher, firms tend to pay less dividends, thus the 
payout ratio can be used as a proxy for the firm’s level of financial constraints, as it 
indicates whether the firm has or not enough internal funds. 
The recent increase in the number of cross-delistings from U.S. exchange markets 
motivates additional empirical research on the effects of such delistings. Despite the fact 
that compliance with SOX (of 2002) provisions have increased the cost of cross-listing, 
it was mainly after the passage of Rule 12h-6 of 2007 that the number of foreign firms 
leaving U.S. markets has spiked. The previous literature on cross-delistings is consistent 
with the “bonding” hypothesis by showing that when foreign firms cross-delist from a 
U.S. exchange they observe the contrary effect to when they cross-listed. On average, 
firms observe a reduction in their market value post-cross-delisting and market 
generally reacts negatively to deregistration4 announcements (Marosi and Massoud, 
2008; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2010; Fernandes, Lel and Miller, 2010; Hostak et al., 
2013). As for the reasons to cross-delist from a U.S. exchange market, we can identify 
in prior research two main sets of explanations (Marosi and Massoud, 2008; Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz, 2010; Fernandes, Lel and Miller, 2010). The first relates to two 
important changes in the regulatory environment of the U.S. markets: (i) the more 
 
3
 Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005) obtain this information from the notes in the annual form 20F that firms are required to file 
with the SEC. 
4
 Deregistration is the procedure to terminate registration with the SEC, which always implies delisting from a U.S. stock exchange. 
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demanding regulatory requirements imposed by the SOX in 2002, and (ii) the passage 
of Rule 12h-6 of 2007, which made the deregistration process easier. Previous studies 
have found a significant negative stock price reaction to deregistration announcements 
before the adoption of Rule 12h-6 (e.g., Marosi and Massoud (2008)), although 
statistically insignificant after the Rule (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2010; Fernandes, 
Lel and Miller, 2010). Nevertheless, Fernandes, Lel and Miller (2010) show that the 
stock price reaction is significant and negative for countries with poor quality of the 
information environment, as well for firms from countries with weak investor protection 
regimes (e.g., countries with French Civil Law legal origin and with low levels of 
judicial efficiency). They interpret their results as being consistent with the “bonding” 
hypothesis; firms that deregister no longer benefit from being under the surveillance of 
the U.S. markets regulators. 
The second set of reasons for cross-delisting and deregistration is related to the 
determinants and economic consequences at the firm-level. Foreign firms face a trade-
off between the costs and benefits of remaining listed on a U.S. stock exchange; for 
some types of firms, however, the cost may outweigh the benefits. Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2010) find that firms that deregister have poor growth opportunities and little 
need for external finance. They also find that foreign firms with more agency problems 
have worse stock-price reactions to the adoption of the Rule 12h-6 due to investors 
recognizing an increase in the costs of information asymmetry.  
Nevertheless, prior research has not yet documented the real economic 
consequences of cross-delisting, in particular the impact on corporate investment. Given 
this gap in the literature and taking all the above evidence together, we develop our 
research hypotheses about the effects of cross-delisting on firms’ financial constraints 
and investment sensitivities. We borrow from the previous literature (e.g., Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005)) the idea that a 
financially constrained firm is one that displays a significant investment sensitivity to 
cash flow. Consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005)), 
cross-listing in the U.S. should allow foreign firms to relax the financial constraints they 
face in their home markets. If this is the case, it follows that a cross-delisting should 
have the reverse effect. Even when the firm’s need for external financing is low, 
delisting from a U.S. exchange might lead to a higher cost of capital, given that the 
quality of the firm’s information environment deteriorates as it is no longer under the 
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stringent disclosure requirements imposed by the SEC. Hereupon, we develop our first 
testable hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The investment-to-cash flow sensitivity should increase following a 
cross-delisting from a U.S. exchange market. 
 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) present an alternative model to test the 
level of financial constraints. Basically, instead of investment, they test the cash-to-cash 
flow sensitivity, where “cash” is given by the ratio of cash and marketable securities to 
total assets. The rationale to study the cash-to-cash flow sensitivity is that more 
constrained firms should display a systematic propensity to save cash out of cash flows. 
Therefore, it is not likely that the information content of cash flows over cash holdings 
could be attributed to its ability to predict future investment opportunities. Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach (2004) argue that cash-to-cash flow sensitivity is positively 
correlated with proxies for financial constraints and that this relation is systematically 
stronger and less ambiguous than what we can observe using instead the investment-to-
cash flow sensitivity. This argument leads us to our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The cash-to-cash flow sensitivity should increase following a cross-
delisting from a U.S. exchange market. 
 
According to the “bonding” hypothesis, foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S., in 
particular on exchange markets, benefit from an improvement in their information 
environment (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). This improvement allows not only firms 
to become more transparent to outside investors, but also stock prices become more 
informative to insiders, as traders from both markets (domestic and foreign) can impart 
information about the firms’ growth prospects. Foucault and Frésard (2012) use this 
argument to show that managers can learn from more informative stock prices and use 
that “learning” to make better investment decisions. Empirically, this would result in a 
higher sensitivity of investment to stock prices (Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004; Chen, 
Goldstein and Jiang, 2007) after the cross-listing (Foucault and Frésard, 2012). Indeed, 
the fact that firms can attract more foreign investors, especially from countries that are 
relevant for the firm’s growth opportunities (as shown in Loureiro and Taboada (2015)), 
7 
 
can improve the information quality of stock prices as outsiders impound new 
information into prices that was not known to managers. In the particular context of 
cross-listings, Foucault and Frésard (2012) show that foreign firms that cross-list in a 
U.S. exchange observe an increase in their investment-to-price sensitivity. We posit that 
a reverse effect should occur when foreign firms delist from a U.S. stock exchange, in 
particular for those that observe a deterioration in their information environment. As 
noted by Foucault and Frésard (2012), some foreign firms may delist from U.S. markets 
just because the gain in terms of stock price informativeness has decreased and is no 
longer relevant. In those cases, we should not observe any effect on the investment-to-
price sensitivity post-cross-delisting. However, many firms may cross-delist for other 
unrelated reasons and lose the “bonding” benefits of being cross-listed, thus 
deteriorating their information environment. Those firms would face more 
informational frictions after cross-delistings, increase the levels of information 
asymmetry, and reduce the quality of stock price informativeness for managers. 
Therefore, for firms that suffer a negative informational shock we would expect a 
decrease in the sensitivity of investment to stock prices. Based on these ideas we 
formulate our last hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The adverse effect of cross-delisting on investment-to-price sensitivity 
should be positively correlated to the increase in firm’s information asymmetry post-
cross-delisting. 
 
3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
 
Starting from the universe of foreign firms cross-listed on the major U.S. stock 
exchanges, we identified all cross-delistings that occurred between 2000 and 20125. We 
use firms listed on major stock exchanges to ensure better data availability and more 
uniform listing requirements. We obtain a list of all foreign firms with equity shares 
registered and reporting with the SEC from the SEC’s website. Next, we search on 
 
5
 Our sample period starts in 2000 because information about foreign firms registered and reporting with the SEC is not available in 
1995 and in 1999 at the SEC’s website. 
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EDGAR’s archive6 for all Form 15’s filed between 2000 and 2012. With this 
information, we track firms that delisted during our sample period. Most firms traded in 
the U.S. issue American Depositary Receipts7 (ADRs), which are managed by a U.S. 
depositary bank such as the Bank of New York or Citibank. Thereby, we complement 
the data obtained from SEC’s sources with these obtained from the websites of New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) 
and Over-The-Counter (OTC) Markets Portal. Information from all different sources is 
manually cross-checked. Firms that move from one major exchange to another are not 
treated as delisted, whereas firms that delist from an exchange market and move to an 
OTC market or “Pink Sheets” are treated as delisted. 
For each firm, we collect the market value of equity, total assets, capital 
expenditures, sales, cash flows, and additional variables used in the empirical tests for 
the sample period. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4949) because their accounting figures are ruled 
by special statutory requirements. To reduce the effect of outliers, all the variables are 
winsorized at the 1% in each tail of the distribution. All variables in U.S. dollars are 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) adjusted considering 2000 prices.  
We further eliminate observations with negative or missing information on sales, 
market value, capital expenditures, book value of equity, and debt. Following prior 
literature (e.g., Loureiro and Taboada (2015)), we exclude firms with total assets lower 
than $10 million to make firms more comparable across countries. We exclude firms 
that only listed in 2012 because we required at least two years of observations. 
We collect financial data from the Worldscope database. Bond rating information is 
from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. Industry- and country-level 
variables are collected from a variety of other sources. All variables are described in 
detail in Appendix A. 
This data screening procedure results in a final longitudinal panel of 583 treatment 
firms from 38 countries, a primary control group of 564 firms that remained cross-listed 
over the sample period, and an alternate control group of 10,397 firms that have never 
 
6
 Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system  (EDGAR’s) provided by the SEC. 
7
 Foreign firms can obtain or issue equity financing by using Level 1, 2 or 3 ADRs. Level-1 ADR it is the only ADR’ Level is 
quoted on the OTC market. A level-2 ADR provides shares listed and traded on the U.S. exchange markets. The Level-3 ADR is 
used when a company has made a public offering in the U.S. Our sample includes only Level-2 and Level-3 ADRs. 
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been cross-listed over our sample period 2000-2012, nor in the three years prior to the 
beginning of the period. 
 
3.2 Sample Description 

Table 1 describes our sample by country, including the number of observations and 
the number of firms that have been cross-listed on U.S. exchange markets from 2000 to 
2012. Additionally, we provide the same information for the treatment group, and the 
two control groups of cross-listed and never-cross-listed firms. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Overall, the main sample comprises 1,147 foreign firms, 583 treatment (cross-
delisted) firms and 564 control (cross-listed) firms. Aiming to address confounding 
effects around delisting event, we also use an alternate control sample of 10,397 purely 
domestic listed firms (the “never-cross-listed” control group). Hence, the treatment 
group has 4,187 firm-year observations, the primary control group of cross-listed firms 
counts for 4,891 firm-year observations, and the alternate control group of never-cross-
listed firms counts for 87,965 observations.  
Overall, most of the cross-delisted firms are from Common Law countries8 (61.8%), 
followed by French Law countries (21.4%) in the middle, and German-Scandinavian 
Law countries (16.8%) in the bottom. 
 
Table 2, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics for the main firm-level variables by 
treatment group, control group of cross-listed firms, and control group of never-cross-
listed firms. Panel B of Table 2 reports univariate tests of the difference in means and 
medians between treatment and control groups, for all the main variables. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Panel A of Table 2 we observe that the treatment group displays, on average, 
lower total assets, lower Q and Sales Growth (i.e., lower growth opportunities), and 
lower corporate profitability (ROA) than the control group of cross-listed firms. The 
average investment ratio is also lower for treatment firms, however this difference is 
statistically significant but not economically large. Treatment firms are more levered, 
and display higher probability of financial distress (measured by O-Score) when 
 
8
 We follow La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) and assign firms according to the legal origin of domestic markets. 
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comparing with cross-listed firms. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the differences in 
means and medians between treatment and control group of cross-listed firms are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, except for Financing Deficit that is 
insignificant.  
 
Regarding the comparison between treatment firms and never-cross-listed firms, on 
average, treatment firms are larger, have higher Q, and higher leverage, but are less 
profitable (ROA) than never-cross-listed firms. Moreover, the differences between 
treatment and control group of never-cross-listed firms are statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. 
 
3.3 Measuring the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity 
 
To test hypothesis 1 – that investment-to-cash flow sensitivity is expected to 
increase post-cross-delisting – we follow the previous literature (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (1988), Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005)) and employ a difference-in-
differences methodology. Our baseline specification is the following equation: 
 
, =  + 	
,++, + 
, ×  × , +
+
, × +
, × , + , ×  + 	,	 +
 !,	 + "# + $% +  + &,''''''''   (1) 
 
where the dependent variable , is a measure of corporate investment for firm i in year 
t. In most of regressions, , is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures scaled by 
lagged property, plant and equipment (PPE). 
, is the net income plus depreciation 
and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total assets.  is an indicator variable 
equal to one if firm i is included in our treatment group, and zero otherwise. , is 
an indicator variable equal to one if treatment firm i is delisted in year t, and zero 
otherwise. ,	 controls for growth opportunities and corresponds to normalized stock 
price, measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity scaled by the book value of total assets. The variable  !,	, the 
logarithm of total assets, is included to control for the impact of firm size on corporate 
investment decisions. In our main regressions we also include dummies to control for 
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country,'"#, industry9, $%, and year, . Because of fixed effects framework, some of the 
coefficients in Equation (1) drop out due to collinearity. 
Regarding our baseline specification (1), the main coefficient of interest is 
'(
, ×  × ,), which captures the change in investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity following the cross-delisting event for our treatment group, relative to the 
control groups. Per hypothesis 1, we predict a positive coefficient , which means an 
increase in investment-to-price sensitivity after cross-delisting.  
 
3.4 Financial Constraints Criteria 
 
Financial constraints are more severe the higher is the information asymmetry of the 
firm, which can lead to credit rationing when accessing external financing sources. 
There is, however, a fine line between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
If we define a financially constrained firm as one for which it is more difficult to obtain 
external rather than internal financing, then virtually, all firms could be classified as so 
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Therefore, there is a comprehensive number of approaches 
to sort firms into financially constrained and unconstrained categories. Since we do not 
have strong prior empirical evidence about which approach is the best, we start with 
five alternative criteria to assign firms in constraint and unconstraint groups.  
i) Payout ratio. We use this measure in the spirit of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988), and compute it following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) as the 
ratio of total distributions to shareholders (both dividends and stock repurchases) 
divided by the operating income (see Appendix B). Every year, firms are 
classified as financially constrained (unconstrained), whenever they are in the 
bottom (top) three deciles of annual payout, respectively.  
ii) KZ index. Proposed by Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) and based on 
empirical results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), this index was applied to our data 
through a linearization process described in Appendix B. Firms in the top (bottom) 
three deciles of the KZ index are considered financially constrained 
(unconstrained). We allow firms to change their financial constraints status over 
our sample period.  
 
9
 We assign firms to industries using the classification scheme of Fama and French (1997), based on 48 industry portfolios.  
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iii) WW index. Proposed by Whited and Wu (2006); similar to what we did for the KZ 
index (see Appendix B), we consider firms in the top (bottom) three deciles of the 
WW index as financially constrained (unconstrained), respectively. Again, we 
allow firms to change their financial constraints status over the sample period.  
iv) SIZE. Measured as the logarithm of total assets, SIZE has been used in the 
literature as a proxy for financial constraints (e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
(1995)); we follow this literature and classify firms as financially constrained 
(unconstrained) if the size of their assets is in the bottom (top) tercile. 
v) BOND RATING. In line with Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), we 
collected data on firms’ bond ratings and classify those firms that have never had 
their public debt rated during our sample period as financially constrained, 
provided that they have some public debt outstanding. However, the lack of 
information for most of the firms in our sample led us to adopt an alternative 
approach. Earlier studies (e.g., Whited (1992), Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994), 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), 
Lemmon and Zender (2010)) interpret the presence of rated debt as a signal that 
firms can access relatively low-cost debt markets, suggesting a large debt capacity. 
We must notice though that some firms may simply chose not to issue (rated) 
debt, although they have the capacity to do so. To minimize these concerns, we 
follow Lemmon and Zender (2010) and use a predictive (logit) model of whether a 
firm has a bond rating in a given year. The dependent variable is one if a firm has 
a debt rating in a given year, and zero otherwise. The covariates in the logit 
regression are SIZE (log of total assets), ROA (earnings before interest and taxes 
scaled by total assets), the Fixed Assets ratio (measured as property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by total assets), the (Tobin’s) Q (normalized stock price, 
measured as market value of equity plus book value of assets less book value of 
equity scaled by book value of total assets), the Leverage ratio (total debt scaled 
by total assets), AGE (the logarithm of the number of years since the firm first 
appeared on Datastream), and the Standard Deviation (STDEV) of stock returns. 
All of the covariates are lagged one period10 and are described in Appendix A. 
Firms are classified as financially constrained (unconstrained) if the estimated 
 
10
 We also include industry, year and country fixed effects. 
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probability of having a rated debt falls into the bottom (top) terciles of the 
distribution. 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the level of investment and cash holdings of 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Using the Payout Ratio, WW index, 
SIZE, and Rating criteria, we observe that financially constrained firms invest more and 
hold more cash than unconstrained firms. This difference is statistically significant, 
except for investment when we classify firms based on the WW index. Using the KZ 
index gives quite different results: more financially constrained firms as the ones that 
invest less and hold less cash.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
From the results in Table 3, we conclude that it seems more reliable to use Payout 
ratio, SIZE and Rating, rather than KZ or WW indexes, to classify firms in terms of their 
level of financial constraints. In fact, some studies also claim that KZ index is not a 
reliable measure (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004); Chang and Song, 2013); as 
for the WW index, because it includes SIZE, which is already by itself a measure for 
financial constraints, may also be a limitation. Another valid concern is to assess 
whether these proxies measure financial constraints or just debt capacity. If a firm is 
financially unconstrained it is more likely to fund its financing deficit with debt than to 
issue equity, while for a financially constrained firm that has restricted access to bond 
markets it is more likely to fund its deficit issuing equity (e.g., Lemmon and Zender 
(2010), Chang and Song (2013)). Assuming that debt capacity holds constant, firms 
should use debt to fund small financing deficits, but will choose equity when external 
financing needs start to increase (Lemmon and Zender, 2010). Therefore, we employ 
the Lemmon and Zender (2010) modification test of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
to test the quality of our measures of financial constraints controlling for debt capacity 
concerns. Hence, we will test the following equation: 
 
∆*!+, =  + 	,,-,.'/-, + ,,-,.'/-,
 '+ "# + $% +  +
&,                         (2) 
 
where ∆*!+, corresponds to changes in the Leverage ratio, measured as total debt 
(short-term plus long-term debt) scaled by total assets, of firm i in year t. 
14 
 
,,-,.'/-,	 is the sum of dividends, net investments and net changes in 
working capital minus internal cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets (see Frank and 
Goyal (2003)). "# controls for the country effects. $% controls for the industry effects.  
controls for the year effects. 
According to Lemmon and Zender (2010), firms with no concerns over debt 
capacity will use essentially debt to cover their financial deficit, therefore, 	 should be 
positive and significant11, whereas firms with more concerns over debt capacity (i.e., 
more financially constrained firms) will only use debt to cover small deficits and issue 
equity to cover larger deficits. That being the case, we should expect  to be negative 
and statistically significant and 	 still positive, but weakly or not statistically 
significant. Assuming that financial constraints and debt capacity are closely related, i.e. 
firms with less concerns over debt capacity should be less financially constrained, we 
use equation (2) to infer about the quality of our measures of financial constraints. We 
do so by estimating equation (2) on groups of financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms classified according to our proxies – Payout ratio, KZ index, WW index, SIZE, 
and Rating. If our measures are good at identifying firms with more limited debt 
capacity, then we should observe a negative and statistically significant coefficient  in 
the group of financially constrained firms. It is worth noting, however, that limited debt 
capacity is just a form of financial constraints (Lemmon and Zender, 2010). Other 
aspects, such as higher levels of information asymmetry between insiders and investors 
are also expected to increase financial constraints (Chang and Song, 2013).  
 
In Table 4 we show estimations of equation (2) using subsamples of constrained and 
unconstrained firms classified upon our main proxies of financial constraints. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results indicate that firms classified as financially constrained are indeed those 
with lower debt capacity as the coefficients  are negative and statistically significant, 
whereas coefficients 	 are insignificant. This is true for all measures except for the KZ 
and WW indexes. Therefore, hereafter, we will rely on the Payout ratio, SIZE, and 
Rating as our main measures of financial constraints.  
 
 
11
 Note that Lemmon and Zender (2010) assume pecking order firms; thus, provided that firms have debt capacity, financing deficits 
will first be funded by debt. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Investment-to-Cash Flow Sensitivity Following Cross-Delisting from U.S. Exchange 
Markets 
 
To test whether investment-to-cash flow sensitivity increases post-cross-delisting 
(hypothesis 1), we estimate several alternative specifications of equation (1). Table 5 
shows the results.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
As in previous studies (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Lins, Strickland 
and Zenner (2005)), we find that investment is positively related with cash flow. The 
coefficient 	 (
,) is statistically significant across all models. Consistent with our 
first hypothesis, we predict a positive and statistically significant coefficient  (
, ×
 × ,), suggesting that post-cross-delisting firms will face more restrictions 
to access external financing, thus making investments more dependent on internal 
sources. The coefficient ' captures the changes in investment sensitivity to cash flow 
after cross-delisting for our treatment group, relative to the control groups of cross-
listed and never-cross-listed firms. Using our baseline (model (1)) as an example, a one-
standard-deviation increase in 
ℎ'12 (0.17 – see Panel A of Table 2) represents an 
increase of 0.009 in investment prior to the cross-delisting event for the average 
treatment firm, which is associated with a 2.8% increase in investment12. In the post-
cross-delisting, the increase in investment associated with a one-standard-deviation 
increase in 
ℎ'12 is 0.0422, which corresponds to a 14.1% increase13.  
The coefficients of SIZE and Q have the expected sign: ,	 is positively related 
with investment because it captures the growth opportunities, and  !,	 is 
negatively related with investment suggesting that larger firms tend to invest 
significantly less as a percentage of total assets. 
We estimate different specifications of equation (1) to check the robustness of our 
baseline results. In model (2), we cluster standard errors at country- and year-level, and 
in model (3) we use firm fixed effects, instead of country and industry fixed effects. 
 
12
 The sum of coefficients is (0.2366+-0.1864) x 0.17=0.0085. The mean of our investment variable is 0.30 (from Panel A of Table 
2). Therefore, a 0.0085 increase is equivalent to a 2.8% (0.0085/0.30) increase in investment. 
13
 The sum of coefficients is (0.2366+0.1979+-0.1864) x 0.17=0.0422. Thus, a 0.0422 increase is equivalent to a 14.1% 
(0.0422/0.30) increase in investment. 
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Results in both models are similar in sign and magnitude to the ones shown in the 
baseline model. 
In model (4) we use a matched sample of treatment and control group of cross-listed 
firms. This robustness check is justified due to the construction of our treatment and 
control groups, which raises several concerns. For instance, the decision to cross-delist 
can be involuntary or voluntary14, meaning that, in general, firms are not randomly 
assigned to the treatment group; thus, in our analyses we need to deal with potential 
sample selection biases. The act of cross-delisting, per se, is a quasi-experiment where 
we can identify a treatment group of companies that cross-delist, and a control group 
not subject to the same treatment. One problem in quasi-experimental studies is that one 
is not able to observe the counterfactual, i.e., there may be some omitted variables that 
simultaneously affect the decision to cross-delist and our outcome variables (e.g., firms’ 
investment decisions). Therefore, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) 
methodology proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). In the PSM procedure we 
match each treatment firm to a control firm in the same industry, country, year, and with 
the closest SIZE (which is also one of our financial constraints criterion); we use PSM 
technique selecting the nearest neighbor with replacement15, to find the best match(es) 
for each treatment firm16.  
As shown in model (4), the results are very similar to what we find when using a 
non-matched control sample, namely we still find a positive and statistically significant 
.  
To mitigate concerns about confounding events (e.g., changes in economic or 
regulatory environment that are unrelated to the cross-delisting event) around the same 
time of cross-delisting, we estimate our baseline model using a control sample of non-
matched (model (5)) and matched (model (6)) sample of never-cross-listed firms. The 
results are similar to what we found before.  
In Panel B of Table 5 we estimate equation (1) using two different measures of 
corporate investment: i) capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets minus cash 
 
14
 Firms can be forced to delist from U.S. exchange markets due to disqualification to continue listed. See 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ and http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com. 
15
 We apply matching technique with nearest neighbor and caliper, which corresponds to a propensity score range. The proper 
caliper was computed following Wang et al. (2013), and corresponds to 0.2 of propensity score standard deviation. 
16
 The quality of matching is tested using the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) chi2 test, which tests the goodness-of-fit of the probit model 
used in the propensity score estimation; if the propensity score is the most suitable one, the coefficients of such specification should 
not be significantly different from zero. 
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and short-term investments17; ii) assets growth. Assets growth captures all investment 
activities, such as acquisitions and divestitures18. We estimate the regressions using the 
same type of control samples – matched and non-matched cross-listed and never-cross-
listed firms. Once again, the results show coefficients of the same sign and similar 
statistical to the ones uncovered before. 
Taken together, the results in Table 5 provide strong evidence supporting hypothesis 
1.   
 
4.1.1 Investment-to-Cash Flow Sensitivity: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
We proceed our robustness checks by analyzing the reasons why firms cross-delist 
and how they may interfere with the positive effect on investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity post-cross-delisting documented in the previous section. Foreign firms may 
cross-delist from U.S. exchange markets for a variety of reasons and motivations. We 
first divide cross-delisted firms in two groups, depending on whether the delisting was 
voluntary or involuntary. Cross-listed firms in the U.S. can be suspended and 
involuntarily delisted from U.S. exchange markets due, for example, to violations of 
stock exchanges rules, while others may decide to voluntarily cross-delist even if they 
meet the requirements imposed by the markets’ regulators. After the passage of Rule 
12h-6 of 2007, cross-delisting became easier and less costly, thus a larger and more 
diversified number of firms voluntarily cross-delisted; this would happen whenever the 
anticipated gains did not cover the costs of remaining listed on a U.S. stock exchange. 
Therefore, we further subdivide voluntary cross-delisting into two different periods: 
pre- and post- the passage of Rule 12h-6. We estimate equation (1) by each group and 
show the results in Table 6. 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
In models (1) to (4) we observe that the coefficient  of the main variable of 
interest (
, ×  × ,), is positive and statistically significant. In line with the 
results uncovered in the previous section, those results show that post-cross-delisting 
the investment-to-cash flow increased, suggesting that these firms became more 
 
17
 The denominator of this investment measure (total assets minus cash and short term investments) reflects the invested capital. 
18
 Kumar and Ramchand (2008) provide evidence that over 40% of their sample of cross-listed firms in U.S. exchange markets 
acquire a U.S. local firm after they cross-list. 
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financially constrained. The magnitude of coefficient  is larger for the group of 
involuntary cross-delistings – 0.252 versus 0.219 for the group of voluntary cross-
delistings; both statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
In models (5) to (8) of Table 6, we estimate the same regressions on subsamples of 
voluntary cross-delistings of firms from Common Law and Civil Law countries, 
following the typical classification of previous literature (e.g., La Porta et al. (1997; 
1998), La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), Djankov et al. (2008)) and 
assign firms according to the legal origin, i.e., from Common Law countries in the high 
group of shareholder protection and firms from Civil Law19 countries in the low group. 
We find no significant change in investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity after cross-
delisting for firms from Common Law countries. This evidence is consistent with the 
argument that firms from Common Law countries have already stronger investor 
protection regimes and stronger information disclosure requirements than firms from 
Civil Law countries, which facilitates the access to external financing in their home 
markets. This is also consistent with the “bonding” hypothesis that predicts a lower 
marginal benefit of cross-listing in the U.S, for firms coming from countries with better 
shareholder protection. Similarly, the reverse effect of cross-delisting should be less 
severe for firms from these same types of countries.  
 
To address concerns of possible confounding events occurring in the post-cross-
delisting period for a considerable number of firms that can also affect their investment-
to-cash flow sensitivity20, we perform a robustness check to test the validity of our 
identification strategy. If the increase in investment-to-cash flow sensitivity following 
cross-delisting is associated with the cross-delisting event, this increase should emerge 
around the delisting event and be persistent after that. To test this prediction we follow 
previous studies (Hail, Tahoun and Wang, 2014; Loureiro and Taboada, 2015) and 
create the following indicator variables: the pre-delisting event (Pre Event) – a dummy 
variable that is one for years t-2 and t-1 relative to delisting event, and zero otherwise; 
the delisting event (Event) – a dummy variable that is one for year t relative to delisting 
event, and zero otherwise; and the post-delisting event (Post Event) –  a dummy 
 
19
 Firms assigned in the low group are from French Civil Law countries. 
20
 One example would be the financial crisis of 2007-2008. If a considerable number of firms cross-delisted before or around the 
financial crisis, then the increase in investment-to-cash sensitivity may be driven by the post-crisis negative impact on firms’ 
financial constraints than by the cross-delisting event. 
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variable that is one for years t+1, t+2, and t+3 relative to delisting event, and zero 
otherwise. We interact each of the indicator variables (Pre Event, Event, and Post 
Event) with 
, and estimate equation (3) using only the treatment sample.' 
 
, =  + 	
,+3'!4,.+!4,, + 31'!4,, + 
, ×
3'!4,, + 
, × !4,,+
, × 31'!4,, + 	,	 +
 !,	 + "# + $% +  + &,''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''     (3) 
 
where , is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. 
, is 
the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets. 3'!4,',, !4,,, 31'!4,,, are the same as before. ,	 is the 
market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
scaled by the book value of total assets.  !,	 is the logarithm of total assets. 
Regresssions include year, country and industry fixed effects. 
To be consistent with previous results, we expect the coefficient  to be 
insignificant and the coefficients 'and  to be positive and statistically significant, 
meaning that the increase in investment-to-cash flow sensitivity should occur after the 
cross-delisting event. Table 7 shows the results.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
We estimate equation (3) considering the treatment group (model (1)) and the 
subsample of voluntary cross-delistings (model (2)). According to our expectations, the 
coefficients 'and 'are positive and significant across models. 
Overall, these findings provide support to our hypothesis 1, i.e., that increase in 
investment-to-price sensitivity materializes after the cross-delisting event. 
 
As a last robustness test, we use a matched sample of treatment and control group of 
cross-listed firms based on the same covariates of model (4) of Table 5, but instead of 
SIZE, we use the other financial constraints criteria as covariates: the Payout Ratio and 
Rating. Once again, we estimate the propensity scores based on year, industry, country 
and on the two alternate financial constraints, using the nearest neighbor technique 
(with replacement). Table 8 shows the results.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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As shown in Table 8, the results are very similar to what we find in our baseline 
specification; we still uncover a positive and statistically significant . This additional 
test corroborates our previous results and also gives additional evidence on support of 
hypothesis 1. 
 
4.2 Cash-to-Cash Flow Sensitivity around and Following Cross-Delisting from U.S. 
Exchange Markets 
 
Our prior results show an increase in investment sensitivity to cash flow after cross-
delisting that we interpreted as firms becoming more financially constrained post-cross-
delisting. However, even in the absence of financial constraints, we may observe a 
positive relationship between investment and cash flow if cash flows contain 
information about the relation between investment demand and growth opportunities. 
Thus, following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), an alternative is to test the 
sensitivity of cash holdings (rather than investment) to cash flow. The authors show that 
financial constraints are related to a firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash inflows, 
which they refer to as the cash flow sensitivity of cash. Thus, financially unconstrained 
firms should not display a systematic propensity to save cash, while firms that are 
constrained should have a positive cash-to-cash flow sensitivity. One advantage of 
using this model rather than the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity is to avoid concerns 
of potential multicollinearity problems when including  and 
ℎ'12 because both 
variables capture growth opportunities. Therefore, there is a stream of literature initiated 
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) that argue that the higher investment-to-cash flow 
sensitivity of constrained firms documented by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) 
probably is being affected by a measurement error in the construction of  variable21 
(e.g., Erickson and Whited (2000), Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Moyen (2004), Chen and 
Chen (2012)). 
 
Given our previous results, and per hypothesis 2, we predict a significant and 
positive relation between cash holdings and cash flow for treatment firms following the 
 
21
 For instance, as argued by Gomes (2001), the financial constraints status should be included in the market value of the firm and 
should also be captured by'. Therefore, the collinearity between cash flow and  suggests that any sizable measurement error in 
the construction of  can reduce the overall correlation between ' and investment and augment the correlation between investment 
and cash flow. 
21 
 
cross-delisting. To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate equation (1) replacing the 
dependent variable by cash holdings, measured as cash and marketable securities scaled 
by lagged total assets.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Table 9 shows the results of our estimations. Consistent with hypothesis 2, we find 
that the firms in the treatment group exhibit a higher propensity to save cash out of cash 
flows post-cross-delisting as the coefficient  (
, ×  × ,) is positive 
and significant in all regression models. Taking model (1) as an example, a standard 
deviation increase in 
ℎ'12' (0.17 – Panel A of Table 2) represents an increase of 
0.004 in cash prior to the cross-delisting that represents a 1.8% increase22. Following 
cross-delisting, the increase in cash associated with a one-standard deviation increase in 

ℎ'12' is 0.0302, which corresponds to a 13.7% increase23. The results are 
qualitatively identical when we use matched and non-matched control samples of cross-
listed and never-cross-listed firms and different combinations of year, country, industry, 
and firm fixed-effects and clustered standard errors by country and year. Altogether, this 
evidence suggests that cross-delisted firms save more cash out of cash flows 
surrounding and after cross-delisting, which can be interpreted as a sign of these firms 
facing higher financial constraints following the cross-delisting event.  
 
As an additional test of hypothesis 2, we follow Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004) and use an alternative approach in which a firms’ decision to change its cash 
holdings is modeled as a function of a number of sources and uses of cash, such as 
capital expenditures, net acquisitions, changes in noncash net working capital, and 
changes in short-term debt. Hence, we estimate the following equation: 
 

67, =  + 	
,++, + 
, ×  × , + 
, ×
+
, × , + , × +	,	 +  !,	 +
!89,:;, + 6-<;1,, + ∆=>
, + , + "# + $% +
 + &, ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''          (4) 
 
 
22
 The sum of coefficients is (-0.0087+0.0321) x 0.17=0.004. The mean of cash variable is 0.22 (from Panel A of Table 2). 
Therefore, a 0.004 increase is equivalent to a 1.8% (0.004/0.22) increase. 

 The sum of coefficients is (-0.0087+0.0321+0.1540) x 0.17=0.0302. Thus, a 0.0302 increase is equivalent to a 13.7% 
(0.0302/0.22) increase. 
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where 
67, is the ratio of cash and marketable securities scaled by lagged total assets 
of firm i in year t. 
, is the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses 
scaled by lagged total assets.  is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is 
included in our treatment group, and zero otherwise. , is an indicator variable 
equal to one if treatment firm i is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise. ,	 is the 
market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
scaled by the book value of total assets.  !,	 is the logarithm of total assets. 
!89,:;, is capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. 6-<;1,, is 
net assets from corporate acquisitions scaled by lagged total assets. ∆=>
, is the 
change in non-cash net working capital scaled by lagged total assets. , corresponds 
to the change in short-term debt scaled by lagged total assets. Again, in our main 
regressions we also control for country, industry and year fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors by firm and year. Table 10 reports the results of estimations of equation 
(4). 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Overall, the sign and magnitude of our main coefficient of interest, , does not 
differ from the results in Table 9. We can conclude that, on average, delisted firms save 
more of cash out of cash flows than the firms in the control groups. The coefficients of 
Expenditures and Acquisitions are negative in (almost) all regressions. This can be 
explained by the fact that, at some point in time, firms must pay for those investment 
activities. The coefficients on NWC are not significant and on STD display 
significant and positive estimatives, which is consistent with the argument that changes 
in short-term debt could be a substitute for cash (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004)).  
In addition, we replicate previous tests of investment-to-cash flow sensitivity 
analisys using equation (4), aiming to provide further support to hypothesis 2. Table 11 
reports the results. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
In Panel A of Table 11 we replicate tests of Table 6 and estimate equation (4), using 
the subsample of voluntary cross-delistings by groups of pre- and post-Rule 12h-6, 
ranking firms in high (low) group according to the legal origin (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008)). Again, the coefficient  is significant and positive 
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across estimations, except for models (4) and (5) using the high (Common Law) 
subgroup. The increase in cash-to-cash flow sensitivity post-cross-delisting is stronger 
for firms from low (Civil Law) group both in the pre- and in the post-Rule 12h-6. 
 
Moreover, we also replicate tests of Table 8, using a matched sample of treatment 
and control group of cross-listed firms based on industry, country, year and on two 
alternate financial constraints criteria, Payout Ratio and Rating. As shown in Panel B of 
Table 11, the results are very similar to what we find in our previous tests; we still find 
a positive and statistically significant . 
 
Overall, these results give further support to hypothesis 2. 
 
4.3 Investment Sensitivity to Information Content of Stock Prices around and Following 
Cross-Delisting from U.S. Exchange Markets 

Our results so far show an increase in investment and cash sensitivities to cash flow 
following cross-delisting. We now test the impact of cross-delisting on the information 
content impounded into stock prices. Per the “bonding” hypothesis, a U.S. cross-listing 
is associated with a significant improvement in a firm’s informational environment. Not 
only because foreign firms have to commit to higher standards of information 
disclosure, but also because cross-listing in the U.S. attracts more analysts coverage 
(e.g., Lang, Lins and Miller (2003), Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006)). If this is so, we 
should expect that cross-delisting produces the opposite effects, i.e., a deterioration of 
the firm’s information environment and consequent increase in information 
asymmetries. Indeed, this effect may partially explain the evidence we found so far that 
post-cross-delisting firms become more financially constrained – a deterioration in the 
firm’s information environment raises the cost of external financing and stresses the 
firm’s financial constraints resulting in an increased sensitivity of investment and cash-
to-cash flow. A way to determine the quality of the information environment is to test 
how informative stock prices are for managers to make their investment decisions. If the 
information content impounded into stock prices is high, then stock prices are more 
informative and help managers to make better investment decisions. Empirically, if 
stock prices become more informative to managers, we should observe a higher 
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sensitivity of investment to stock prices (Bond, Edmans and Goldstein, 2012; Foucault 
and Frésard, 2012). Thus, firms that suffer larger adverse information shocks should 
observe a decrease in their investment-to-price sensitivity. In our hypothesis 3, we posit 
that firms that are more severely affected by a negative shock to their information 
environment post-cross-delisting should have a reduction in their investment-to-price 
sensitivity.  
We use two proxies of information asymmetry to capture negative information 
shocks suffered by firms after their cross-delisting. Our first measure of information 
asymmetry, as in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), is the bid-ask spread – the 
difference between ask and bid prices, calculated as the annual median of the daily 
difference between ask and bid prices, and scaled by themean of ask and bid prices. 
Our second proxy for information asymmetry is the change in R&D expenses; the 
rationale for using this measure is that the presence of intangible assets are positively 
correlated with information asymmetry due to economic uncertainty relating to 
intangibles (Barth and Kasznik, 1999; Aboody and Lev, 2000; Barth, Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2001, Loureiro and Taboada, 2015).  
To test our hypothesis 3 we follow Loureiro and Taboada (2015) and compute 
changes, on an annual basis, for our two measures of information asymmetry, bid-ask 
spread and R&D expenses. Then, we compute changes on these measures around the 
cross-delisting year (t), from years t-1 to t+1 and t-2 to t+3. Based on these changes, we 
create a dummy variable (=,)'that is one for firms with values above median, and 
zero otherwise. Thus, when =, 'is one, it means that the firm suffered an adverse 
information shock. We estimate the following equation considering only the treatment 
group: 
 
, =  + 	,	+.+=, + ,	 × , × =, + 	 ×
,+	 × =,+, × =, + 	
, +  !,	 + "# + $% +
 + &, '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''         (5) 
 
where , is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. ,	 
is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of 
equity scaled by the book value of total assets. ','is an indicator variable equal to 
one if treatment firm i is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise.'=,'is defined as 
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before.' 
, is the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by 
lagged total assets.  !,	 is the logarithm of total assets. We expect that firms that 
suffered a more severe information shock (INF=1) post-cross-delisting, observe a 
decrease in the quality of the information content impounded into their stock prices, i.e., 
a lower investment-to-price sensitivity. Hence, we expect a negative coefficient of our 
main variable of interest (,	 × , × =,). Table 12 shows the results. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
In models (1) and (2) of Table 12 we measure the information shock using changes 
in bid-ask spreads, and in models (3) and (4) we use changes in R&D. The results show 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient , which means that the information 
content of stock prices decreases following the cross-delisting event for firms that 
suffered a greater deterioration in their information environment. The economic 
magnitude of coefficient  is larger in the models (1) and (3) that capture changes in 
information asymmetry between t-1 to t+1 relative to the cross-delisting event in year t. 
Taking model (1) as an example, for the average treatment firm, a one-standard-
deviation increase in  (1.50, for the treatment group) represents an increase of 0.12 in 
investment prior to cross-delisting or a 41.2% increase24. In contrast, in the post-cross-
delisting the increase in investment associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in 
 is -0.018, which corresponds to a decrease of 6.2%25. 
 
In our final tests, we explore cross-country variations of the impact of cross-
delisting on the quality of firm’s information environment, depending on whether they 
are from countries with stronger or weaker shareholder protection. According to Bailey, 
Karolyi and Salva (2006), the (“bonding”) benefits from cross-listing on a U.S. 
exchange are more pronounced for firms from countries in which information disclosure 
requirements are lower. If this is the case, cross-delisted firms from countries with 
higher standards of financial disclosure should experience no change in investment-to-
price sensitivity after cross-delisting. McLean, Zhang and Zhao (2012) document that 
investor protection is positively associated with stock price sensitivity; firms from 
 
24
 The sum of coefficients is (0.0650+0.0147) x 1.50=0.12. The mean of investment for the treatment group is 0.29. Thus, a 0.12 
increase is equivalent to a 41.2% (0.12/0.29) increase. 

The sum of coefficients is (0.0650+-0.1246+0.0329+0.0147) x 1.50=-0.018. Thus, a 0.018 decrease is equivalent to a 6.2% (-
0.018/0.29) decrease. 
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countries with poor information disclosure requirements and poor shareholder 
protection may benefit the most from an improvement in the information environment 
and reach higher standards of corporate governance. Such improvements can mitigate 
agency problems and encourage investors to gather private information and, by trading, 
make stock prices more informative (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008). 
We then analyze whether firms from countries with higher governance standards 
and more developed capital markets are less penalized in the quality of their stock price 
informativeness post-cross-delisting conditional on having an adverse information 
shock. We use the Disclosure requirements index proposed by La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes and Shleifer (2006) as a proxy for the quality of information environment at the 
country-level, and the stock market capitalization scaled by Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) as a proxy for capital markets development. We then assign each firm to high 
(low) levels of each measure if the firm is from a country with above (below) the 
median value. We re-estimate equation (5) for each group and show the results in Table 
13. 
 [Insert Table 13 here] 
The results show a more negative and statistically significant coefficient  for firm 
from countries with weaker disclosure requirements (low Disclosure) and less 
developed capital markets (low stock market capitalization-to-GDP). This means that 
mainly firms from these countries suffer an effective deterioration in the information 
quality of their stock prices as a consequence of a negative information shock post-
cross-delisting. In contrast, the coefficient  is only statistically significant in models 
(3) and (5) for firms from countries with higher disclosure standards and developed 
financial markets However, the magnitude of the coefficient  in model (3) is about 
half of the size of the coefficient in model (4) – low market capitalization to GDP – and, 
more importantly, the z-test for the equality of  between models (3) and (4) is 
statistically different from zero, meaning that the documented negative impact on stock 
price quality is indeed significantly stronger for countries from less developed markets. 
Also the coefficient  of model (5) - high Disclosure – is of small magnitude than 
coefficient in model (6). Again, coefficients in both models are statistically different; 
the z-test for the equality of  between models (5) and (6) is statistically different from 
zero.  
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In sum, we find support for our hypothesis 3 and conclude that firms that observe a 
greater increase in information asymmetry post-cross-delisting effectively suffer a 
greater reduction in the information quality of their stock prices with real consequences 
on investment decisions. Lower stock price informativeness leads to higher costs of 
external financing, increasing firm’s financial constraints. Therefore, this evidence 
reveals a potential mechanism – the deterioration of the information environment – to 
explain our prior results that post-cross-delisting firms become more financially 
constrained. This conclusion is consistent with the idea of foreign firms losing the 
“bonding” benefits when they cross-delist from a U.S. exchange. 
 
5. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study we provide new evidence about the real economic effects of cross-
delisting from U.S. stock exchanges on firms’ financial constraints and investment 
sensitivities. We use cross-delistings as a quasi-experiment and employ a difference-in-
differences methodology to test our main hypotheses that post-cross-delisting firms 
become more financially constrained and their information deteriorates. Our sample 
consists of 583 firms from 38 countries that cross-delisted from a U.S. exchange 
(treatment firms), 564 cross-listed control firms, and 10,397 never-cross-listed control 
firms, over the period of 2000-2012. We document an increase in investment- and cash-
to-cash flow sensitivities following a cross-delisting from U.S. exchange markets for 
our group of treatment firms compared to each of the control groups of cross-listed or 
never-cross-listed firms. This result is quite persistent and does not depend on whether 
the cross-delisting was voluntary or involuntary; it does not depend also on whether the 
cross-delisting occurred before or after the Rule 12h-6 of 2007, which that made 
deregistrations and cross-delistings easier and less costly. This evidence supports our 
argument that post-cross-delisting firms become more financially constrained. We also 
show that this effect is stronger for firms from Civil Law countries; thus, keeping all 
else equal, firms that face weaker domestic shareholder protection seem to lose more 
after cross-delisting from U.S. stock exchanges.  
As the increase in financial constraints may, in part, be related to a deterioration in 
firm’s information environment post-cross-delisting, we further investigate whether 
stock prices become less informative for managers following the cross-delisting. We 
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find that investment-to-price sensitivity decreases after cross-delisting for firms that 
increased their information asymmetry (higher bid-ask spreads or R&D expenses) 
around the delisting event. This finding might help to explain the increasing sensitivity 
of investment to internal funds; cross-delisted firms face higher financial constraints, 
which can be partially driven by asymmetry deterioration in their information 
environment and in turn enhances the firms’ cost of capital. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the “bonding” hypothesis; if foreign firms 
are able to improve their information environment after cross-listing on a U.S. exchange 
market, especially when those firms come from countries with poor shareholder 
protection and less developed financial markets, then we expect to find the opposite 
effect when they leave the U.S. markets. Our study provides evidence that this is the 
case and that there are adverse real economic consequences that affect firms’ investment 
decisions.  
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Appendix A - Definitions and Sources of the variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
Firm-level   
Acquisitions Net assets from acquisitions divided by lagged total 
assets. Worldscope 
AGE Logarithm of the number of years since firms 
appeared for the first time in Database. Datastream 
Assets Growth Percentage change in total assets over a one-year 
period. Worldscope 
Bid-Ask spread Yearly median of the daily difference between ask 
and bid prices, scaled by the midpoint. Datastream 
Bond Rating Bond rating from the Standard and Poor’s agency. 
SDC and Datastream 
Capex-to-TA 
 
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) divided by lagged 
total assets (TA) minus cash and short-term 
investments. 
Worldscope 
Cash Flow Net income plus depreciation and amortization 
expenses divided by lagged total assets. Worldscope 
Cash Holdings Cash and marketable securities divided by lagged 
total assets.  
Worldscope 
 
Delist Dummy variable that equals one if a firm is delisted 
from U.S. exchange markets (NYSE or NASDAQ) in 
a given year, and zero otherwise. 
SEC website, Datastream 
and Citibank 
Expenditures Capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. Worldscope 
 
Financing Deficit  Numerator: the sum of cash dividends, net 
investments, and net changes in working capital, less 
internal cash flows (net income, depreciation and 
amortization expenses, and deferred taxes). 
Denominator: lagged total assets (see Frank and 
Goyal, 2003). Deferred taxes are set to zero when 
they are missing. 
Worldscope 
Fixed Assets ratio Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) divided by total 
assets. Worldscope 
Investment  Capital expenditures (CAPEX) divided by lagged 
property, plant and equipment (PPE). Worldscope 
Leverage ratio Total debt (short-term plus long-term debt) divided by 
total assets. Worldscope 
Market 
capitalization  
Market price (year-end) multiplied by the number of 
common shares outstanding, denominated in U.S. 
dollars and converted at fiscal year-end exchange 
rates. 
Datastream 
O-Score O=1.3-0.4X1+6.0X2-1.4X3+0.8X4-2.4X5-
1.8X6+0.3X7-1.7X8-0.5X9 
X1=log(total assets); X2=total liabilities-to-total 
assets; X3=net working capital-to-total assets; 
X4=current liabilities-to-current assets;X5=1 (if total 
liabilities exceeds total assets) or 0 otherwise;X6=net 
income-to-total assets;X7=cash flow from operations-
to-total liabilities;X8=1 (if net income was negative 
for the last two years) or 0 otherwise; X9=changes in 
net income scaled by the net income for the last 2 
years. 
Ohlson (1980) 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
R&D Changes in research and development (R&D) 
expenses. R&D is set to zero when it is missing. Worldscope 
Rating Probability of a firms’ debt being rated predicted by a 
logistic model proposed by Lemmon and Zender 
(2010). 
Worldscope 
 
Return on Assets  
(ROA) 
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by 
total assets. Worldscope 
Sales Growth Sales growth is measured as the percentage change in 
sales over year t-1 to t Worldscope 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets. 
Worldscope 
Standard 
deviation stock 
returns 
Yearly standard deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns.   Datastream 
(Tobin's) Q Numerator: market value of equity plus book value of 
assets minus book value of equity. Denominator: 
book value of assets. 
Worldscope 
 
Total Assets (TA) Total Assets in U.S. dollars, converted at fiscal year-
end exchange rates.  Worldscope 
Treat Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is included in 
the treatment group or 0 otherwise. 
SEC website, 
Datastream and Citibank 
Net Working 
capital (NWC) 
Current assets excluding cash and marketable 
securities divided by current liabilities. Changes in 
NWC is scaled by lagged total assets. 
Worldscope 
Short-Term 
Debt (STD) 
Changes in short-term debt scaled by lagged total 
assets. Worldscope 
Industry-Level  
 INDUSTRY Classification according Fama and French 48 Industry 
Codes. 
Fama and 
French (1997) 
SIC CODE 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. 
Datastream 
Country-Level  
 Legal Origin Indicator variable that equals one for Common Law 
(Civil Law) countries and zero otherwise. 
La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
Market cap-to-
GDP  
Market capitalization divided by Gross domestic 
product (GDP). World Bank 




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Appendix B – Measures of Financial Constraints 
I. PAYOUT RATIO 
Following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), the Payout ratio is the ratio of 
cash dividends plus repurchases of common and preferred stock26 to operating income, 
thus we have: Payout ratio = (Cash Dividends + Repurchases) / Operating Income  
 
II. KZ INDEX 
The KZ INDEX is calculated adopting Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) 
method: 
@ = −1.001909
, + 0.2826389, + 3.139193!I, − 39.36780+,
− 1.314759
67, 
where, 
, is Cash Flow (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization expenses) divided by lagged PPE; , is measured as total liabilities plus 
market value of equity plus preferred stock27 minus deferred taxes divided by the total 
capital (sum of long- and short-term debt plus total shareholders’ equity); !I, is the 
sum of total long- and short-term debt divided total capital; +, is the sum of cash 
dividends of common and preferred dividends divided by lagged PPE; 
67, is cash 
and short-term investments divided by lagged PPE. 
 
III. WW INDEX 
>> = 0.091
, + 0.021*6, − 0.062+3M, − 0.044*=6,
+ 0.102N, + 0.035N, 
 
where, 
, is Cash Flow (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization expenses) divided by total assets; *6, is the sum of total long- and 
short-term debt divided by divided by total assets; +3M, is a dummy variable that 
takes one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise; *=6, is the logarithm of 
total assets; N, is the firm’s 3-digit industry sales growth; N, is the annual 
percentage change in sales.  
 
26
 Repurchases of common and preferred stock are set to zero when they are missing. 
27
 Preferred stock is set to zero when it is missing. 
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TABLE 1: Sample Description by Country 
Table 1 describes the number of firms (“No. Firms”) and the total number observations (“Obs.”) for the full 
sample of cross-listings, and for cross-delisted and control firms by country of origin. We exclude financial 
firms (SIC Code 6000-6999) and strictly regulated firms (SIC Code 4900-4949). Exchange consists of all 
firms that have been listed on U.S. exchange markets over 2000-2012. Treatment is the subsample of firms 
in our sample that have cross-delisted at some point in time between 2000 and 2012. “Pre” and “Post” are 
the corresponding number of observations for the treatment firms before and after the cross-delisting event. 
Control includes two control groups: 1) control group of firms that remained listed over the sample period; 
2) control group of never-cross-listed firms. *Denotes a country designated as an emerging market by 
Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database.  
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
  
Full Sample (Exchange) 
  
Treatment 
  
Cross-listed 
 
Never-cross-
listed 
 
No. Firms Obs. 
 
No. 
Firms 
       Obs. 
 
No. 
Firms Obs.  
No. 
Firms Obs. Pre       Post 
Argentina* 7 71 2 11 1 5 60 27 249 
Australia 26 138 19 81 40 7 57 83 581 
Austria 1 6 1 6 6 0 0 47 538 
Belgium 4 26 2 12 1 2 14 44 489 
Brazil* 30 295 13 93 16 17 202 42 506 
Canada 353 2,188 194 869 200 159 1,319 178 1,571 
Chile* 14 129 9 54 31 5 75 80 836 
China* 131 592 23 77 2 108 515 1,724 11,727 
Colombia* 1 5 0 0 0 1 5 22 189 
Denmark 4 39 2 14 8 2 25 59 732 
Finland 7 40 6 27 19 1 13 72 902 
France 32 236 23 131 83 9 105 340 3,592 
Germany 25 147 20 88 86 5 59 201 1,573 
Greece 30 167 6 25 3 24 142 137 1,052 
Hong Kong 38 253 20 102 33 18 151 684 5,710 
Hungary 1 12 1 12 3 0 0 18 167 
India* 13 112 4 26 13 9 86 989 6,563 
Indonesia* 2 30 0 0 0 2 30 277 2,571 
Ireland 17 128 9 39 16 8 89 10 53 
Israel 91 704 38 191 71 53 513 84 606 
Italy 11 109 6 42 22 5 67 95 923 
Japan 24 272 9 71 30 15 201 1,021 11,193 
Korea* 12 88 7 28 12 5 60 1,161 9,819 
Luxembourg 13 86 8 56 29 5 30 8 53 
Mexico* 33 302 16 101 73 17 201 51 555 
Netherlands 37    246 26 142 68 11 104 68 661 
New Zealand 4 24 3 11 24 1 13 44 364 
Norway 15 111 7 47 22 8 64 91 694 
Peru* 2 22 1 9 6 1 13 68 635 
Philippines* 2 20 1 7 0 1 13 67 632 
Poland* 1 2 1 2 11 0 0 192 1,284 
Portugal 1 13 0 0 0 1 13 41 444 
Russia* 7 58 4 37 12 3 21 163 689 
Singapore 6 54 4 30 13 2 24 463 3,924 
South Africa* 9 92 3 16 18 6 76 135 1,219 
Spain 7 46 4 28 2 3 18 57 649 
Sweden 14 74 13 61 63 1 13 171 1,467 
Switzerland 12 106 7 42 21 5 64 63 683 
Taiwan 11 104 1 9 3 10 95 567 5,271 
Turkey* 1 13 0 0 0 1 13 217 1,949 
United Kingdom 94 666 66 338 148 28 328 522 4,529 
Venezuela* 4 20 4 20 23 0 0 14 121 
All Countries 1,147 7,846   583 2,955 1,232   564 4,891   10,397 87,965 
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TABLE 2: Summary Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample of treatment and control groups of cross-listed and never-cross-listed firms, between 2000 and 2012. Total Assets are in 
US$ million, reflecting 2000 prices. Investment is capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. Cash Flow is net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by 
lagged total assets. Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities scaled by lagged total assets. Q is measured as the market value of equity plus book value of 
assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over a one-year period. ROA is measured as earnings before 
interest and taxes scaled by total assets. O-Score is a measure of predictive financial distress proposed by Ohlson (1980). Financing deficit corresponds to the sum of dividends, 
net investments and net changes in working capital minus internal cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets (see Frank and Goyal, 2003). Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel A shows the mean, median, standard deviation (“SD”) and the number of observations (“N”) for all our main variables. 
Panel B reports the differences in means and medians between cross-delisted firms and control groups of cross-listed and never-cross-listed firms. Differences in means are tested 
using t-statistic test (t-statistics in parentheses) and differences in medians are tested using Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistics in parentheses). ***, ** and * mean statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
                      CONTROL 
Sample:  Full Sample 
 
Treatment 
 
Cross-listed   Never-cross-listed  
 
Mean Median SD N 
 
Mean Median SD N 
 
Mean Median SD N 
 
Mean Median SD N 
Total Assets 8,101.29 989.55 20,600.00 9,078 
 
5,209.68 812.71 12,200.00 4,187 
 
10,575.10 1,260.78 25,400.00 4,891 
 
590.88 135.72 1,533.19 87,965 
Investment 0.30 0.20 0.37 9,078 
 
0.29 0.18 0.39 4,187 
 
0.32 0.21 0.36 4,891 
 
0.34 0.15 0.72 87,965 
Cash Flow 0.06 0.08 0.17 9,078 
 
0.04 0.07 0.18 4,187 
 
0.08 0.10 0.16 4,891 
 
0.07 0.07 0.11 87,965 
Cash Holdings 0.22 0.13 0.25 9,078  0.21 0.12 0.25 4,187  0.23 0.15 0.25 4,891  0.16 0.11 0.17 87,965 
Q 1.94 1.42 1.62 9,078 
 
1.82 1.35 1.50 4,187 
 
2.05 1.49 1.75 4,891 
 
1.50 1.15 1.06 87,965 
Sales Growth 0.08 0.07 0.47 9,078  0.05 0.05 0.45 4,187  0.10 0.09 0.48 4,891  0.07 0.07 0.32 87,965 
ROA 0.04 0.06 0.17 9,078 
 
0.02 0.05 0.18 4,187 
 
0.06 0.07 0.16 4,891 
 
0.07 0.06 0.12 87,965 
O-Score 0.08 0.02 0.16 9,025 
 
0.10 0.03 0.19 4,159 
 
0.06 0.01 0.13 4,866 
 
0.12 0.05 0.19 87,525 
Financing Deficit 0.07 0.02 0.26 9,078 
 
0.07 0.02 026 4,187 
 
0.08 0.02 0.26 4,891 
 
0.04 0.00 0.22 87,965 
Leverage 0.23 0.21 0.20 9,078 
 
0.25 0.24 0.21 4,187 
 
0.21 0.18 0.19 4,891 
 
0.23 0.21 0.19 87,965 
 
 
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Panel B - Univariate Comparisons between Treatment and Control Groups 
Control Sample: Cross-listed firms   Never-cross-listed firms 
  Differences in Means Differences in Medians 
 
Differences in Means Differences in Medians 
Total Assets -5,365.42 *** -448.06 *** 
 
4,618.79 *** 676.99 *** 
 
(13.14) 
 
(8.14) 
 
 
(24.59) 
 
(48.55) 
 Investment -0.028 *** -0.034 *** 
 
-0.053 *** 0.028 *** 
 
(3.50) 
 
(8.26) 
 
 
(8.21) 
 
(10.08) 
 Cash Flow -0.043 *** -0.025 *** 
 
-0.036 *** 0.001 *** 
 
(11.97) 
 
(12.26) 
 
 
(12.94) 
 
(5.56) 
 Cash Holdings -0.026 *** -0.030 *** 
 
0.044 *** 0.005 *** 
 
(4.99) 
 
(7.67) 
 
 
(11.41) 
 
(5.33) 
 Q -0.242 *** -0.140 *** 
 
0.309 *** 0.194 *** 
 
(7.23) 
 
(8.50) 
 
 
(13.66) 
 
(20.04) 
 Sales Growth -0.056 *** -0.038 *** 
 
-0.025 *** -0.022 *** 
 
(5.74) 
 
(8.44) 
  
(3.59) 
 
(6.33) 
 ROA -0.043 *** -0.026 *** 
 
-0.052 *** -0.016 *** 
 
(11.95) 
 
(12.40) 
 
 
(18.39) 
 
(15.99) 
 O-Score 0.043 *** 0.014 *** 
 
-0.025 *** -0.023 *** 
 
(12.34) 
 
(17.12) 
 
 
(8.22) 
 
(20.95) 
 Financing Deficit -0.008 
 
-0.001 
  
0.030 *** 0.015 *** 
 
(0.55) 
 
(0.75) 
  
(7.31) 
 
(7.68) 
 Leverage 0.042 *** 0.064 *** 
 
0.019 *** 0.031 *** 
  
(9.88)   (9.62)     (5.59)   (3.06)   

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TABLE 3: Summary Statistics of Investment and Cash holdings across financially 
constrained (unconstrained) firms 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for Investment and Cash holdings for the groups of financially 
constrained (“C”) and unconstrained (“U”) firms, namely the mean, median, standard deviation (“SD”) 
and the number of observations (“N”). Investment is capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. Cash 
holdings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities scaled by lagged total assets. Payout ratio is total 
distributions scaled by operating income, as described in Appendix B. Firms are ranked as financially 
constrained (unconstrained) those in the bottom (top) terciles of annual payout. KZ index proposed by 
Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) is described in Appendix B. Firms in the top (bottom) three deciles 
of the KZ index ranking are considered financially constrained (unconstrained). WW index proposed by 
Whited and Wu (2006) is described in detail in Appendix B. Firms in the top (bottom) terciles of the WW 
index are considered financially constrained (unconstrained). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Rating 
is estimated using the model proposed by Lemmon and Zender (2010) that predicts whether a firm has a 
bond rating in a given year. Financially constrained (unconstrained) in terms of SIZE and Rating are those 
in the bottom (top) terciles of the variables. Differences in means are tested using t-statistic test (p-value  
in parentheses) and differences in medians are tested using Wilcoxon rank sum test (p-value in 
parentheses). ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
Investment=Capex-to-lagged PPE   Cash holdings=Cash-to-lagged TA 
 
Mean Median SD N   Mean Median SD N 
i) Payout Ratio 
         Constrained (C ) 0.34 0.19 0.46 2,929 
 
0.29 0.19 0.30 2,929 
Unconstrained (U) 0.24 0.19 0.25 2,841 
 
0.15 0.10 0.16 2,841 
(C )=(U) (p-value) (0.000) (0.909) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
  ii) KZ Index 
         Constrained (C ) 0.21 0.14 0.27 2,723 
 
0.10 0.07 0.11 2,723 
Unconstrained (U) 0.46 0.29 0.50 2,723 
 
0.40 0.32 0.32 2,723 
(C )=(U) (p-Value) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
  iii) WW Index 
         Constrained (C ) 0.31 0.21 0.36 2,372 
 
0.24 0.16 0.24 2,372 
Unconstrained (U) 0.30 0.20 0.39 2,372 
 
0.21 0.12 0.26 2,372 
(C )=(U) (p-Value) (0.401) (0.000) 
   
(0.063) (0.000) 
  iv) SIZE 
         Constrained (C ) 0.40 0.23 0.50 2,572 
 
0.36 0.29 0.32 2,572 
Unconstrained (U) 0.22 0.19 0.17 2,853 
 
0.12 0.09 0.11 2,853 
(C )=(U) (p-Value) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
  v) Rating 
         Constrained (C ) 0.30 0.17 0.40 2,495 
 
0.22 0.14 0.25 2,495 
Unconstrained (U) 0.26 0.20 0.24 2,498 
 
0.16 0.10 0.19 2,498 
(C )=(U) (p-Value) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
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TABLE 4: Lemmon and Zender (2010) modified test for financing constraints 
Table 4 shows regression estimates of equation (2) for the groups of financially constrained (“C”) and unconstrained (“U”) firms according to five criteria of financial contraints. 
Payout ratio is measured as total distributions scaled by operating income as described in Appendix B. Firms are ranked as financially constrained (unconstrained) those in the 
bottom (top) terciles of annual payout. KZ index proposed by Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) and is described in Appendix B. Firms in the top (bottom) terciles of the KZ 
index ranking are considered financially constrained (unconstrained). WW index proposed by Whited and Wu (2006) is described in detail in Appendix B. Firms in the top 
(bottom) terciles of the WW index ranking are considered financially constrained (unconstrained). SIZE is measured as logarithm of total assets. Rating is estimated using the 
model proposed by Lemmon and Zender (2010) that predicts whether a firm has a bond rating in a given year. Financially constrained (unconstrained) in terms of SIZE and 
Rating are those in the bottom (top) terciles of the variables. The dependent variable is changes in Leverage, which is measured as the percentage change in total debt over a one-
year period. Financing deficit corresponds to the sum of dividends, net investments and net changes in working capital minus internal cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets 
(see Frank and Goyal, 2003). Financing deficit2 is the square of Financing deficit. All variables are defined in Appendix A. In all models standard errors are clustered by year- 
and firm-level. Regresssions include year, country and industry fixed effects. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent 
level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: changes in leverage 
FC criterion:  Payout Ratio KZ Index WW Index SIZE Rating 
C U C U C U C U C U 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Financing deficitt 0.2182 0.4955*** 0.3184*** 0.0847 0.1569 0.1455 0.1619 0.3966*** 0.1029 0.7909*** 
 
(1.38) (3.39) (4.76) (0.54) (1.10) (1.08) (0.83) (4.64) (0.98) (4.88) 
Financing deficit2t -0.3784** -0.3849** -0.0050 -0.3485* -0.0944 -0.2502** -0.3582* -0.2209*** -0.3291*** -0.6165** 
 
(-2.40) (-2.10) (-0.04) (-1.72) (-0.58) (-2.19) (-1.82) (-2.59) (-3.62) (-2.45) 
Constant 0.2739 0.0740 0.0744 -0.0743 0.0695 0.8791 1.3741*** 0.1727*** -0.0844 1.1249*** 
 
(0.85) (0.58) (0.32) (-0.14) (0.34) (1.12) (3.23) (6.56) (-0.43) (7.18) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,087 2,577 2,565 1,830 1,989 1,968 1,496 2,839 2,050 2,297 
R-squared 0.045 0.070 0.096 0.053 0.029 0.069 0.059 0.061 0.079 0.068 
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TABLE 5: Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity 
Table 5 reports regression estimates of equation (1) using different specifications. The dependent variable 
is Investment, which is measured as capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. Cash Flow is the net 
income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total assets. Treat is a dummy 
variable equal to one for firms included in our treatment group, and zero otherwise. Delist
 t is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise. Q is the market value of 
equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. SIZE is 
the logarithm of total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A. In Panel A, models (1)-(4) show 
results for the full sample using the primary control group of cross-listed firms. In model (4) we use a 
control matched sample of cross-listed firms. Firms are matched by country, year, industry, and SIZE 
using the PSM technique (nearest neighbor with replacement). Models (5) and (6) show results using the 
alternate control group of never-cross-listed firms. In all models, except for model (2), standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year; in model (2) standard errors are clustered by country and year. The p-value of 
Likelihood-ratio (LR) test is also reported (in parentheses). Panel B reports regression estimates of 
equation (1) using two alternate measures of corporate investment: i) capital expenditures scaled by 
lagged total assets minus cash and short-term investment; ii) assets growth, which is measured as the 
percentage change in total assets over a one-year period. Models (1) and (2) show results for the full 
sample using the primary control group of cross-listed firms. In Models (3) and (4) we use a control 
matched sample of cross-listed firms. Models (5)-(8) show results using the alternate control group of 
never-cross-listed firms; models (5) and (6) show results for the full sample and models (7) and (8) show 
results of a control matched sample of never-cross-listed firms. In all models standard errors are clustered 
by firm and year. Regressions include year, industry, and country, and firm fixed effects. The last two 
rows show the sum and the respectively p-value of the coefficients [
 + 
 ×  ×  + 
 ×
]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent 
level, respectively. 
Panel A: Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Main Results 
 Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
Control group: Cross-listed Never-cross-listed 
  
Baseline Country Firm FE Matched Sample Baseline 
Matched 
Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CFt 0.2366*** 0.2327*** 0.2935*** 0.1430* 0.3959*** 0.1773* 
 
(3.82) (3.35) (3.71) (1.77) (9.53) (1.65) 
Treati -0.0020 -0.0020  0.0021 0.0878*** 0.0351 
 
(-0.18) (-0.21)  (0.13) (5.17) (1.51) 
Delistt -0.0345** -0.0470*** -0.0205 -0.0411** -0.0536** -0.0497* 
 
(-1.98) (-3.11) (-1.19) (-2.10) (-2.21) (-1.71) 
CFt x Delistt x Treati 0.1979** 0.1757*** 0.2428** 0.1908** 0.2263* 0.2173* 
 
(2.07) (2.88) (2.36) (2.06) (1.78) (1.77) 
CFt x Treati -0.1864** -0.1713** -0.1531 -0.0735 -0.2848*** -0.1305 
 
(-2.26) (-2.56) (-1.41) (-0.54) (-2.78) (-0.85) 
Qt-1 0.0571*** 0.0581*** 0.0629*** 0.0582*** 0.0771*** 0.0888*** 
 
(10.57) (10.25) (10.28) (8.00) (16.20) (8.94) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0338*** -0.0310*** -0.0600*** -0.0348*** -0.0667*** -0.0583*** 
 
(-8.73) (-6.34) (-5.05) (-10.08) (-23.85) (-8.52) 
Constant 0.5523*** 0.6661*** 1.0373*** 0.5710*** 0.7394*** 0.4855*** 
 
(6.04) (5.46) (6.30) (6.31) (15.62) (6.45) 
Firm FE No No Yes No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations\ 9,078 9,078 9,078 5,376 92,152 6,642 
R-squared 0.199 0.181 0.117 0.201 0.129 0.153 
PROPENSITY SCORE       
LR chi2 (p value)    (0.731)  (0.100) 
[
 + 
 ×  
×  + 
 × ] 0.2481*** 0.2371*** 0.3832*** 0.2603** 0.3374** 0.2641* 
p-value (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.038) (0.097) 
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Panel B: Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Robustness tests 
Control Group: Cross-listed Never-cross-listed 
   Matched sample    Matched sample 
Dependent variable: Capex-to-TA Asset Growth Capex-to-TA Asset Growth Capex-to-TA Asset Growth Capex-to-TA Asset Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CFt 0.1808*** 0.7009*** 0.1709*** 0.5562*** 0.1934*** 0.9178*** 0.1466*** 0.7944*** 
 
(8.00) (11.26) (4.88) (3.84) (16.49) (28.07) (5.31) (10.86) 
Treati 0.0037 -0.0240** 0.0015 -0.0253 0.0325*** 0.0463*** 0.0157*** 0.0221 
 
(0.90) (-1.97) (0.32) (-1.42) (7.49) (2.65) (2.90) (1.28) 
Delistt -0.0181*** -0.0221 -0.0188*** -0.0206 -0.0252*** -0.0598*** -0.0189*** -0.0374*** 
 
(-3.09) (-1.59) (-3.04) (-1.35) (-4.96) (-3.38) (-3.27) (-3.71) 
CFt x Delistt x Treati 0.0880*** 0.3150*** 0.0908*** 0.2832*** 0.1165*** 0.2559** 0.1189*** 0.2335** 
 
(2.86) (2.80) (2.85) (2.51) (3.72) (2.23) (3.82) (2.03) 
CFt x Treati -0.1492*** -0.1368 -0.1401*** 0.0243 -0.1493*** -0.2953*** -0.1992*** -0.1271 
 
(-5.36) (-1.45) (-3.31) (0.15) (-5.61) (-3.18) (-3.77) (-1.06) 
Qt-1 0.0178*** 0.0613*** 0.0163*** 0.0697*** 0.01274*** 0.0353*** 0.0201*** 0.0706*** 
 
(9.94) (8.20) (6.72) (6.45) (13.27) (8.64) (8.02) (8.12) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0103*** -0.0304*** -0.0103*** -0.0289*** -0.0080*** -0.0192*** -0.0081*** -0.0275*** 
 
(-5.97) (-7.99) (-5.58) (-7.37) (-12.75) (-11.43) (-5.52) (-7.00) 
Constant 0.1830*** 0.2890*** 0.2101*** 0.1783*** 0.1225*** 0.0267 0.1120*** 0.2069** 
 
(5.34) (3.11) (6.13) (2.10) (9.59) (0.59) (3.78) (2.11) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,078 9,078 5,384 5,384 92,152 92,152 6,647 6,647 
R-squared 0.267 0.236 0.259 0.239 0.144 0.220 0.222 0.266 
[
 + 
 ×  
×  + 
 × ] 
0.1196*** 0.8791*** 0.1216*** 
 
0.8637*** 
 
0.1606*** 0.8784*** 0.0663*** 
 
0.9008*** 
 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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TABLE 6: Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Subsamples of treatment group 
Table 6 reports regression estimates of equation (1) for different subsamples of treatment firms; Involuntary group comprises firms that were forced to leave U.S. markets; 
Voluntary group (“All”) includes firms that decided to leave U.S. exchange markets before (“Pre”) and after (“Post”) the passage of Rule 12h-6 of 2007. In models (1)-(4), we re-
estimate equation (1) by subsamples of treatment firms as described before. In models (5)-(8), we re-estimate equation (1) according to Legal Origin, which is an indicator of 
institutional quality (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008)). Then, we assign firms in high (low) group depending if they are from Common (Civil) Law countries. 
The dependent variable is Investment, which is measured as capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. Cash Flow is the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses 
scaled by lagged total assets. Treat is a dummy variable equal to one for firms included in our treatment group, and zero otherwise. Delistt is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. 
SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A.Is also reported the p-value of a z-test that evaluates whether the coefficient (
, × , ×
) is equal across voluntary subsamples of before (“Pre”) and after (“Post”) the passage of Rule 12h-6. In all models standard errors are clustered by firm and year. 
Regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects.  ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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  Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
 Subsample:  Involuntary Voluntary 
    Legal Origin 
  
   High Low 
All Pre-Rule Post-Rule Pre-Rule Post-Rule Pre-Rule Post-Rule 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CFt 0.2428*** 0.2233*** 0.2206*** 0.2258*** 0.1441 0.1367 0.7069*** 0.7361*** 
 
(3.68) (3.62) (3.44) (3.45) (1.50) (1.39) (2.98) (4.20) 
Treati 0.0117 -0.0176 -0.0056 -0.0349* 0.0172 -0.0535* 0.0215 0.0023 
 
(0.76) (-1.24) (-0.22) (-1.78) (0.40) (-1.71) (0.54) (0.05) 
Delistt -0.0306 -0.0271 -0.0449 0.0288 -0.0750 -0.0357 0.0232 -0.1562** 
 
(-0.69) (-1.38) (-1.53) (0.88) (-1.51) (0.71) (0.48) (-2.22) 
CFt x Delistt,x Treati 0.2523* 0.2187* 0.2301* 0.2594* 0.4503 0.1675 0.2124* 0.7998** 
 
(1.66) (1.77) (1.86) (1.67) (1.51) (0.12) (1.66) (2.04) 
CFt x Treati -0.0960 -0.2511** -0.2912* -0.3017** -0.3556 -0.2637 -0.3863* -0.6690** 
 
(-1.11) (-2.60) (-1.78) (-2.49) (-1.51) (-1.19) (-1.76) (-2.32) 
Qt-1 0.0563*** 0.0538*** 0.0535*** 0.0523*** 0.0496*** 0.0477*** 0.454*** 0.0434** 
 
(8.77) (10.28) (11.13) (9.50) (7.36) (7.19) (4.49) (2.47) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0376*** -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0347*** -0.0305*** -0.0305*** -0.0325*** -0.0380*** 
 
(7.23) (-7.69) (-6.39) (-6.68) (-4.68) (-4.48) (-3.22) (-4.14) 
Constant 0.6919*** 0.5617*** 0.6017*** 0.5329*** 0.8360*** 0.4714*** 0.5316*** 0.5725*** 
 
(4.45) (6.14) (5.36) (4.03) (5.35) (3.80) (3.25) (4.36) 
(Pre-Rule =Post-Rule) (p-value) 
  
(0.887) (0.388) (0.003) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,175 7,794 5,818 6,078 3,079 3,080 1,410 1,519 
R-squared 0.202 0.202 0.205 0.209 0.180 0.178 0.289 0.298 
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TABLE 7: Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Event time analysis 
Table 7 reports the regression estimates for equation (3) for our treatment group of firms (model 1), and 
including only the subsample of Voluntary delistings in model (2). The dependent variable is Investment, 
which is measured as capital expenditures scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment. Cash Flow is 
the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total assets. Delistt is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise. Q is the market 
value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. 
SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A Pre Event is an indicator 
variable that is one for years t-2 and t-1 relative to delisting event, and zero otherwise. Event is an 
indicator variable that is one for year t relative to delisting event, and zero otherwise. Post Event is an 
indicator variable that is one for years t+1, t+2, and t+3 relative to delisting event, and zero otherwise. In 
all models standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Regressions include year, industry and country 
fixed effects. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
  
Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
 
Treatment Voluntary 
 
(1) (2) 
CFt 0.0949 0.0252 
 
(1.25) (0.26) 
Pre Event 0.0018 -0.0053 
 
(0.12) (-0.28) 
Event -0.0589*** -0.0504** 
 
(-2.75) (-2.06) 
Post Event -0.0385* -0.0392* 
 
(-1.75) (-1.77) 
CFt x Pre Event -0.0618 -0.0916 
 
(-0.72) (-0.74) 
CFt x Event 0.2759* 0.4577** 
 
(1.75) (2.36) 
CFt x Post Event 0.2057* 0.2926** 
 
(1.66) (2.05) 
Qt-1 0.0663*** 0.0579*** 
 
(7.05) (4.68) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0351*** -0.0316*** 
 
(-7.75) (-4.97) 
Constant 0.5578*** 0.5235*** 
 
(5.80) (4.23) 
(CFt x Pre Event=CFt x Event) (p-value) (0.024) (0.002) 
(CFt x Post Event=CFt x Event) (p-value) (0.734) (0.424) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Observations 4,187 2,903 
R-squared 0.217 0.226 
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TABLE 8: Investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Matched samples 
Table 8 shows regression estimates of equation (1) using a matched sample of treatment and control 
group of firms. Firms are matched by country, year, industry, and by two alternate financial constraint 
criteria: Payout Ratio and Rating. The dependent variable is Investment, which is measured as capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment. Cash Flow is the net income plus 
depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total assets. Treat is a dummy variable equal to 
one for firms included in our treatment group, and zero otherwise. Delist
 t is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise. Q is the market value of equity plus book 
value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. SIZE is the logarithm of 
total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A. In model (1) we use Payout Ratio, measured as total 
distributions scaled by operating income, as described in Appendix B. In model (2) we use Rating, which 
is estimated using the model proposed by Lemmon and Zender (2010) that predicts whether a firm has a 
bond rating in a given year. In all models standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Regressions 
include year, industry and country fixed effects. Matched samples are constructed using the PSM 
technique, where each treatment firm is matched to a control firm by year, country, industry, and Payout 
ratio/ Rating, by selecting the nearest neighbor (with replacement). The p-value of Likelihood-ratio (LR) 
test is also reported (in parentheses). The last two rows show the sum and the respectively p-value of the 
coefficients [
 + 
 ×  ×  + 
 × ]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at 
the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
Financial Constraint criterion: Payout Ratio Rating 
 
(1) (2) 
CFt 0.0315 0.0689 
 
(0.20) (0.57) 
Treati -0.0116 0.0013 
 
(-0.54) (0.07) 
Delistt -0.0481** -0.0447** 
 
(-2.49) (-2.38) 
CFt x Delisti x Treati 0.1748* 0.2053** 
 
(1.84) (2.11) 
CFt x Treati 0.0397 -0.0139 
 
(0.22) (-0.10) 
Qt-1 0.0598*** 0.0595*** 
 
(7.70) (7.19) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0339*** -0.0343*** 
 
(-8.36) (-8.40) 
Constant 0.5360*** 0.5403*** 
 
(5.92) (5.71) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Observations 5,116 4,950 
R-squared 0.206 0.193 
PROPENSITY SCORE 
  
LR chi2 (p value) (0.731) (0.100) 
[
 + 
 ×  
×  + 
 × ] 0.2460** 0.2603** 
p-value (0.014) (0.011) 
 
 
 
  
48 
 
TABLE 9: Cash-to-cash flow sensitivity. Main Results 
Table 9 reports regression estimates of equation (1) using different specifications. The dependent variable 
is Cash Holdings, which is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities scaled by lagged total 
assets. Cash Flow is the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets. Treat is a dummy variable equal to one for firms included in our treatment group, and zero 
otherwise. Delistt is an indicator variable equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by 
the book value of assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Models (1)-(4) show results for the full sample using the primary control group of cross-listed firms. In 
model (4) we use a control matched sample of cross-listed firms. Firms are matched by country, year, 
industry, and SIZE using the using PSM technique (nearest neighbor with replacement). Models (5) and 
(6) show results using the alternate control group of never-cross-listed firms. In all models, except for 
model (2), standard errors are clustered by firm and year; in model (2) standard errors are clustered by 
country and year. The p-value of Likelihood-ratio (LR) test is also reported (in parentheses). Regressions 
include year, industry, country, and firm fixed effects in different combinations as indicated in the table, 
respectively. The last two rows show the sum and the respectively p-value of the coefficients [
 + 
 ×
 ×  + 
 × ]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 
percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Cash and Marketable securities-to-lagged total assets 
Control group: Cross-listed Never-cross-listed 
  
Baseline Country Firm FE Matched Sample Baseline 
Matched 
Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CFt -0.0087 0.0001 0.1579*** -0.1679** 0.2533*** -0.0239 
 
(-0.17) (0.00) (3.50) (-2.45) (14.84) (-0.52) 
Treati 0.0003 -0.0091 
 
-0.0075 0.1063*** 0.0776*** 
 
(0.03) (-1.02) 
 
(-0.54) (11.26) (7.81) 
Delisti,t -0.0388*** -0.0514*** -0.0344*** -0.0345*** -0.0400*** -0.0474*** 
 
(-3.46) (-4.52) (-3.57) (-2.71) (-3.51) (-3.42) 
CFt x Delistt x Treati 0.1540** 0.1304** 0.1261* 0.1636** 0.1291* 0.1048* 
 
(2.19) (2.05) (1.85) (2.31) (1.93) (1.68) 
CFt x Treati 0.0321 0.0309 -0.0359 0.1940** -0.3099*** 0.0518 
 
(0.49) (0.41) (-0.60) (2.49) (-6.38) (0.88) 
Qt-1 0.0457*** 0.0452*** 0.0314*** 0.0441*** 0.0365*** 0.0497*** 
 
(12.45) (7.17) (8.91) (10.11) (15.81) (12.08) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0360*** -0.0326*** -0.0789*** -0.0317*** -0.0158*** -0.0264*** 
 
(-13.67) (-9.34) (-11.45) (-10.17) (-20.79) (-11.46) 
Constant 0.5284*** 0.5754*** 1.2064*** 0.4999*** 0.1404*** 0.3501*** 
 
(7.94) (8.91) (12.80) (6.49) (8.62) (5.24) 
Firms FE No No Yes No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,078 9,078 9,078 5,384 92,152 6,647 
R-squared 0.405 0.368 0.178 0.199 0.254 0.161 
PROPENSITY SCORE       
LR chi2 (p value)    (0.731)  (0.100) 
[
 + 
 ×  
×  + 
 × ] 0.1774*** 0.1614*** 0.2481*** 0.1897*** 0.0725 0.1327** 
p-value (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.238) (0.017) 
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TABLE 10: Cash-to-cash flow sensitivity. Robustness tests 
Table 10 reports regression estimates of equation (4) using different specifications. The dependent 
variable is Cash Holdings, which is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities scaled by 
lagged total assets. Cash Flow is the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by 
lagged total assets. Treat is a dummy variable equal to one for firms included in our treatment group, and 
zero otherwise. Delistt is an indicator variable equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and 
zero otherwise. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity 
scaled by the book value of assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Expenditures represent capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. Acquisitions represent corporate acquisitions scaled by lagged 
total assets. NWC is the changes in noncash net working capital scaled by lagged total assets.  Short-
Term Debt corresponds to changes in short-term debt scaled by lagged total assets. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Models (1)-(4) show results for the full sample using the primary control group of 
cross-listed firms. In model (4) we use a control matched sample of cross-listed firms. Firms are matched 
by country, year, industry, and SIZE using PSM technique (nearest neighbor with replacement). Models 
(5) and (6) show results using the alternate control group of never-cross-listed firms. Regressions include 
year, industry, country, and firm fixed effects in different combinations as indicated in the table, 
respectively. The p-value of Likelihood-ratio (LR) test is also reported (in parentheses). The last two rows 
show the sum and the respectively p-value of the coefficients [
 + 
 ×  ×  + 
 ×
]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent 
level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Cash and Marketable securities-to-lagged total assets 
Control group: Cross-listed Never-cross-listed 
  
Baseline Country Firm FE Matched Sample Control 
Matched 
Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CFt 0.0441 0.0499 0.1677*** -0.1256 0.2514*** 0.0094 
 
(0.78) (0.56) (3.65) (-1.52) (15.48) (0.20) 
Treati 0.0004 -0.0086 
 
-0.0099 0.0972*** 0.0742*** 
 
(0.04) (-0.96) 
 
(-0.73) (10.38) (7.56) 
Delistt -0.0394*** -0.0525*** -0.0276*** -0.0349*** -0.0365*** -0.0362*** 
 
(-3.85) (-3.65) (-2.90) (-2.97) (-3.48) (-3.54) 
CFt x Delist,t x Treati 0.1534** 0.1368** 0.0953* 0.1613** 0.1171* 0.1000* 
 
(2.26) (2.15) (1.73) (2.35) (1.94) (1.65) 
CFt x Treati 0.0116 0.0124 -0.0163 0.1836** -0.2638*** 0.0548 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (-0.27) (2.05) (-5.55) (0.97) 
Qt-1 0.0454*** 0.0449*** 0.0302*** 0.0435*** 0.0351*** 0.0488*** 
 
(11.92) (6.66) (8.54) (9.54) (15.49) (11.11) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0353*** -0.0316*** -0.0729*** -0.0308*** -0.0145*** -0.0257*** 
 
(-13.33) (-8.77) (-10.41) (-9.75) (-19.71) (-11.17) 
Expenditurest -0.1174** -0.0958 0.0141 -0.1268* -0.0868*** -0.1199** 
 
(-2.52) (-1.55) (0.30) (-1.94) (-10.76) (-2.29) 
Acquisitionst -0.1404*** -0.1712*** -0.1084*** -0.1320* -0.1541*** -0.2304*** 
 
(-2.57) (-4.12) (-3.27) (-1.89) (-6.50) (-2.89) 
NWCt -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0005 
 
(-0.46) (-0.76) (-0.03) (-0.83) (-0.78) (-0.84) 
Short Term Debtt 0.0086*** 0.0081*** 0.0074*** 0.0096*** 0.0421*** 0.0169*** 
 
(4.92) (3.30) (4.90) (3.89) (28.80) (4.73) 
Constant 0.5267*** 0.5723*** 1.1261*** 0.5074*** 0.1308*** 0.3323*** 
 
(7.77) (8.63) (11.74) (6.28) (7.98) (5.25) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,841 8,841 8,841 5,249 91,604 6,533 
R-squared 0.412 0.373 0.188 0.194 0.277 0.159 
PROPENSITY SCORE       
LR chi2 (p value)    (0.731)  (0.100) 
[
 + 
 ×  
×  + 
 × ] 0.2091*** 0.1991*** 0.2467*** 0.2193*** 0.1047* 0.1642*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.002) 
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TABLE 11: Cash-to-cash flow sensitivity. Robustness tests 
Table 11 reports regression estimates of equation (4) using different specifications. The dependent variable is Cash Holdings, which is measured as the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities scaled by lagged total assets. Cash Flow is the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total assets. Treat is a dummy 
variable equal to one for firms included in our treatment group, and zero otherwise. Delistt is an indicator variable equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. 
Expenditures represent capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. Acquisitions represent corporate acquisitions scaled by lagged total assets. NWC is the changes in 
noncash net working capital scaled by lagged total assets.  Short-Term Debt corresponds to changes in short-term debt scaled by lagged total assets. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Panel A reports regression estimates for Voluntary group of treatment firms, further divided in before (“Pre”) and after (“Post”) the passage of Rule 12h-6 of 2007 in 
models (2)-(7). In models (4)-(7), we re-estimate equation (4) according to Legal Origin, which is an indicator of institutional quality (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008)). Then, we assign firms in high (low) group depending if they are from Common (Civil) Law countries. Is also reported the p-value of a z-test that evaluates 
whether the coefficient (
, × , × ) is equal across voluntary subsamples of before (“Pre”) and after (“Post”) the passage of Rule 12h-6. Panel B shows 
regression estimates of equation (4) using a matched sample of treatment and a control group of cross-listed firms. Firms are matched by country, year, industry, and by two 
alternate financial constraint criteria: Payout Ratio and Rating. In model (1) we use Payout Ratio, measured as total distributions scaled by operating income, as described in 
Appendix B. In model (2) we use Rating, which is estimated using the model proposed by Lemmon and Zender (2010) that predicts whether a firm has a bond rating in a given 
year. In all models standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Regressions include year, industry, country, and firm fixed effects. The last two rows show the sum and the 
respectively p-value of the coefficients [
 + 
 ×  ×  + 
 × ]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Panel A: Cash-to-cash flow sensitivity. Robustness tests. Subsamples of treatment group 
 Dependent variable: Cash and Marketable securities-to-lagged total assets 
 
 
  Legal Origin 
 
 
  High Low 
Voluntary Pre-Rule Post-Rule Pre-Rule Post-Rule Pre-Rule Post-Rule 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CFt 0.0356 0.0522 0.0495 -0.0410 -0.0477 0.2302** 0.2125** 
 
(0.61) (0.88) (0.85) (-0.55) (-0.65) (2.44) (2.51) 
Treati -0.0014 -0.0034 -0.0099 -0.0218 -0.0499** 0.0071 0.0164 
 
(-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-2.38) (0.29) (0.46) 
Delistt -0.0498*** -0.0627*** -0.0124 -0.0557** 0.0078 -0.0633*** 0.0177 
 
(-5.16) (-4.09) (-0.84) (-2.04) (0.38) (-4.06) (0.56) 
CFt x Delistt x Treati 0.2628*** 0.2613** 0.1622* 0.3233 0.1212 0.1623** 0.2361* 
 
(3.25) (2.31) (1.87) (1.77) (0.79) (1.95) (1.79) 
CFt x Treati -0.0993 -0.0948 -0.0044 -0.0443 0.0617 -0.3269* -0.1630 
 
(-1.35) (-1.03) (-0.05) (-0.34) (0.58) (-1.80) (-1.58) 
Qt-1 0.0423*** 0.0421*** 0.0437*** 0.0477*** 0.0458*** 0.0119* 0.0235*** 
 
(10.48) (9.93) (10.16) (8.89) (8.47) (1.83) (3.60) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0369*** -0.0383*** -0.0386*** -0.0374*** -0.0377*** -0.0396*** -0.0352*** 
 
(-12.79) (-10.86) (-10.91) (-7.88) (-7.78) (-5.88) (-4.64) 
Expenditurest -0.0783 -0.1192** -0.1011** -0.0345 0.0249 -0.0071 -0.0541 
 
(-1.47) (-2.10) (-1.98) (-0.34) (0.28) (-0.10) (-0.67) 
Acquisitionst -0.1381*** -0.1529*** -0.1521*** -0.2040*** -0.1481** -0.0493 -0.409 
 
(-2.73) (-2.70) (-3.26) (-2.95) (-2.42) (-0.57) (-0.63) 
NWCt 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0003 0.00082 
 
(0.08) (-0.01) (0.45) (0.22) (0.54) (-0.21) (0.46) 
Short Term Debtt 0.0092*** 0.0089*** 0.0094*** 0.0060*** 0.0065*** 0.0114*** 0.0082** 
 
(5.14) (5.82) (4.34) (4.35) (3.25) (2.66) (2.55) 
Constant 0.5664*** 0.5424*** 0.5031*** 0.7986*** 0.6919*** 0.5802*** 0.5038*** 
 
(8.08) (6.82) (7.78) (5.93) (7.79) (5.00) (4.97) 
(Pre-Rule =Post-Rule) (p-value)  (0.460)           (0.833)                   (0.845) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,594 5,662 5,924 2,935 2,937 1,402 1,511 
R-squared 0.427 0.425 0.448 0.392 0.402 0.411 0.574 
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Panel B - Cash-to-cash flow sensitivity. Robustness tests. Matched samples   
  Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
Financial Constraint criterion Payout ratio Rating 
(1) (2) 
CFt -0.0407 -0.1043 
 
(-0.07) (-1.31) 
Treati -0.0090 -0.0015 
 
(-0.06) (-0.12) 
Delistt -0.0393*** -0.0407*** 
 
(-3.32) (-3.37) 
CF1 x Delistt x Treati 0.1529** 0.1622** 
 
(2.22) (2.40) 
CFt x Treati 0.0650 0.1323 
 
(0.87) (1.54) 
Qt-1 0.0442*** 0.0465*** 
 
(9.98) (10.67) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0321*** -0.0324*** 
 
(-10.35) (-9.03) 
Expenditurest -0.1327* -0.1140* 
 
(-1.82) (-1.68) 
Acquisitionst -0.1461** -0.1091* 
 
(-2.09) (-1.70) 
NWCt -0.0014 -0.0016** 
 
(-1.24) (-2.08) 
Short Term Debtt 0.0084*** 0.0085*** 
 
(2.87) (3.81) 
Constant 0.5186*** 0.5381*** 
 
(6.67) (6.51) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No 
Observations 5,014 4,826 
R-squared 0.410 0.410 
PROPENSITY SCORE 
  LR chi2 (p value) (0.731) (0.100) 
[
 + 
 ×  
×  + 
 × ] 0.1772*** 0.1902*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.002) 
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TABLE 12: Investment sensitivity to stock prices and information shocks post- 
cross-delisting 
Table 12 reports regression estimates of equation (5). We use two proxies of information asymmetry: 1) 
the Bid-Ask spread is measured as annual median of the daily difference between ask and bid prices, 
scaled by the midpoint; 2) and R&D expenses. We compute changes on these measures around the cross-
delisting year (t), from years t-1 to t+1 and t-2 to t+3. The dependent variable is Investment, which is 
measured as capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. Q is the market value of equity plus book value 
of assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. Delistt is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise. INF is set to one for firms whose 
changes in Bid-Ask spread and in R&D expenses are above median, and zero otherwise. Cash Flow is the 
net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total assets. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A. In all models standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year. Regressions include year, industry and country fixed effects. The last two 
rows show the sum and the respectively p-value of the coefficients [ +  ×  × = +  ×
 +  × =]. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 
10 percent level, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
Information proxy: Bid-Ask spread R&D 
 
(t-1;t+1) (t-2;t+3) (t-1;t+1) (t-2;t+3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Qt-1 0.0650*** 0.0665*** 0.0608** 0.0604*** 
 
(5.73) (5.28) (5.02) (5.27) 
Delistt -0.0871* -0.0926* -0.1136** -0.1162** 
 
(-1.81) (-1.89) (-2.49) (-2.59) 
INF
 t -0.0181 0.0028 -0.0614 -0.0349 
 
(-0.24) (0.04) (-1.06) (-1.24) 
Qt-1x Delistt x INFt -0.1246*** -0.1004** -0.1443*** -0.0919*** 
 
(-2.71) (-2.44) (-4.01) (-3.66) 
Qt-1x Delistt 0.0329 0.0353 0.0530* 0.0562* 
 
(1.15) (1.14) (1.88) (1.79) 
Qt-1x INFt 0.0147 -0.0101 0.0396 0.0199 
 
(0.36) (-0.31) (1.32) (1.58) 
Delistt x INFt 0.1562* 0.1329* 0.2117*** 0.1243*** 
 
(1.71) (1.77) (2.74) (3.24) 
CFt 0.1174** 0.1153* 0.1210** 0.1204** 
 
(1.99) (1.89) (2.09) (2.03) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0355*** -0.0359*** -0.0353*** -0.0355*** 
 
(-8.29) (-8.43) (-7.85) (-8.06) 
Constant 0.5011*** 0.4986*** 0.5066*** 0.5100*** 
 
(5.13) (4.96) (5.11) (5.11) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
Country FE Yes Yes No No 
Observations 4,187 4,187 4,187 4,187 
R-squared 0.220 0.221 0.223 0.219 
[ +  ×  
× = +  ×  +  × =] -0.0120* -0.0087 0.0091* 0.0446*** 
p-value (0.083) (0.198) (0.099) (0.008) 
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TABLE 13: Investment sensitivity to stock prices. Robustness tests 
Table 13 reports regression estimates for equation (5). We use two proxies of information asymmetry: 1) the Bid-Ask spread is measured as annual median of the daily difference 
between ask and bid prices, scaled by the midpoint; 2) and R&D expenses. We compute changes on these measures around the cross-delisting year (t), from years t-1 to t+1. The 
dependent variable is Investment, which is measured as capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of 
equity scaled by the book value of assets. Delistt is an indicator variable equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in year t, and zero otherwise. INF is set to one for firms whose 
changes in Bid-Ask spread and in R&D are above median, and zero otherwise. Cash Flow is the net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Disclosure is the disclosure requirements index proposed by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2006). Market cap-to-GDP is a 
financial indicator from World Bank. We assign firms based on Disclosure index and Market capitalization scaled by GDP as high or low according if they are above or below the 
median of these variables values, respectively, in their countries. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Is also reported the p-value of a z-test that evaluates whether the 
coefficient (,	 × , × =,') is equal across voluntary subsamples of High and Low. In all models standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Regressions 
include year, industry and country fixed effects. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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  Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
Information proxy: bid-ask spread R&D 
Governance proxy ranking: Disclosure Market cap-to-GDP Disclosure Market cap-to-GDP 
 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Qt-1 0.0693*** 0.0513*** 0.0469*** 0.0803*** 0.0645*** 0.0453*** 0.0458*** 0.0733*** 
 
(5.08) (3.73) (3.75) (5.94) (4.57) (3.15) (3.70) (4.70) 
Delist
,t -0.1299* -0.0854 -0.0945 -0.1052* -0.1511** -0.1081* -0.1270** -0.1237** 
 
(-1.76) (-1.34) (-1.44) (-1.91) (-2.24) (-1.77) (-2.08) (-2.07) 
INFt 0.0859 -0.0842* -0.0029 -0.1813*** -0.0001 -0.1589** -0.0117 -0.1506*** 
 
(1.09) (-1.87) (-0.04) (-2.75) (-0.34) (-2.30) (-0.26) (-2.67) 
Qt-1 x Delistt x INFt -0.0928 -0.1274** -0.0858* -0.2028** -0.1285* -0.2065*** -0.0924 -0.1955*** 
 
(-1.62) (-2.08) (-1.82) (-2.01) (-1.95) (-3.01) (-1.64) (-3.22) 
Qt-1 x Delistt 0.0513 0.0414 0.0302 0.0567 0.0715* 0.0582 0.0444 0.0790** 
 
(1.20) (1.01) (0.85) (1.63) (1.92) (1.33) (1.29) (2.06) 
Qt-1 x INFt -0.0383 0.0384 -0.0124 0.1429** 0.0141 0.0894** 0.0046 0.0900*** 
 
(-1.32) (1.64) (-0.49) (2.47) (0.42) (1.98) (0.21) (2.82) 
Delisti,t x INFt 0.0360 0.2369** 0.0593 0.3025* 0.1220 0.3522*** 0.1323 0.2559*** 
 
(0.34) (2.09) (0.60) (1.95) (1.02) (3.20) (1.43) (2.86) 
CFt 0.0738 0.2160** 0.1381* 0.0673 0.0844 0.2120** 0.1443* 0.0885 
 
(0.91) (2.00) (1.82) (0.74) (1.04) (2.03) (1.86) (1.09) 
SIZEt-1 -0.0477*** -0.0351*** -0.0469*** -0.0261*** -0.0469*** -0.0356*** -0.0461*** -0.0267*** 
 
(-6.27) (-4.36) (-6.29) (-6.17) (-6.09) (-4.27) (-6.22) (-6.06) 
Constant 0.7702*** 0.6147*** 0.4005*** 0.5198*** 0.7532*** 0.6296*** 0.3923*** 0.5271*** 
 
(4.99) (5.26) (3.51) (7.45) (4.71) (4.67) (4.16) (8.37) 
 
(Pre-Rule =Post-Rule) (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,815 1,884 2,019 2,168 1,815 1,884 2,019 2,168 
R-squared 0.216 0.259 0.183 0.321 0.214 0.267 0.180 0.326 
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